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The year 2020 was without a doubt a remarkable and
unprecedented one, on many accounts and for many reasons. Among
other reasons, it was a year in which the major social media platforms
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extensively experimented with the adoption of a variety of new tools
and practices to address grave problems resulting from harmful
speech on their platforms — notably, the vast amounts of
misinformation associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and with the
2020 presidential election and its aftermath. By and large —
consistent with First Amendment values of combatting bad speech
with good speech — the platforms sought to respond to harmful
online speech by resorting to different types of flagging, fact-checking,
labeling, and other forms of counterspeech. Only when confronting
the most egregiously harmful types of speech did the major platforms
implement policies of censorship or removal — or the most extreme
response of deplatforming speakers entirely. In this Article, I examine
the major social media platforms’ experimentation with a variety of
approaches to address the problems of political and election-related
misinformation on their platforms — and the extent to which these
approaches are consistent with First Amendment values. In
particular, I examine what the major social media platforms have
done and are doing to facilitate, develop, and enhance counterspeech
mechanisms on their platforms in the context of major elections, how
closely these efforts align with First Amendment values, and
measures that the platforms are taking, and should be taking, to
combat the problems posed by filter bubbles in the context of the
microtargeting of political advertisements.
This Article begins with an overview of the marketplace of ideas
theory of First Amendment jurisprudence and the crucial role played
by counterspeech within that theory. I then analyze the variety of
types of counterspeech on social media platforms — by users and by
the platforms themselves — with a special focus on the platforms’
counterspeech policies on elections, political speech, and
misinformation in political/campaign speech specifically. I examine in
particular on the platforms’ prioritization of labeling, fact-checking,
and referring users to authoritative sources over the use of
censorship, removal, and deplatforming (which the platforms tend to
reserve for the most harmful speech in the political sphere and which
they ultimately wielded in the extraordinary context of the speech
surrounding the January 2021 insurrection). I also examine the efforts
that certain platforms have taken to address issues surrounding the
microtargeting of political advertising, issues which are exacerbated

by the filter bubbles made possible by segmentation and fractionation
of audiences in social media platforms.
I.

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS AND THE ROLE OF COUNTERSPEECH IN
OUR FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The “marketplace of ideas” or “free trade in ideas” model has long
been acknowledged as the preeminent model on which our First
Amendment free speech protections are based. Although courts
sometimes credit other justifications for protecting speech —
including the role of free speech in our system of democratic selfgovernment1 and in advancing individuals’ interest in self-expression
and self-fulfillment2 — the courts’ preeminent and most frequently
invoked justification or model for freedom of expression is the
marketplace of ideas. The very notion of ideas vying and competing in
the market presupposes an interplay and exchange of ideas and
therefore presupposes that “counterspeech” will be made available in
response to speech and that the citizenry will be able to hear and
receive competing viewpoints and perspectives. Accordingly,
pursuant to this predominant model, the default response to bad
speech is not censorship but more (better) speech. As Justice Brandeis
explained in his oft-quoted concurrence in Whitney v. California: “If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies
[of speech], to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”3 Under the
marketplace theory of the First Amendment, the default remedy for
harmful ideas in the marketplace of speech is not censorship, but
counterspeech, which recognizes the importance of access to diverse,
antagonistic, competing viewpoints and the free trade in ideas, which
functions by allowing those who are exposed to bad speech to be
exposed to good speech as a counterweight. The counterspeech
1 See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 878 (1963).
2 As David Richards explains, the First Amendment rests not only on the value of
creating an informed electorate, but also “rests . . . on the deeper moral premises
regarding the general exercise of autonomous expressive and judgmental capacity
and the good that this affords in human life.” David. A. J. Richards, Free Speech and
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45,
68 (1974).
3 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

mechanism provides that this default remedy applies broadly in most
circumstances, except in the case of “emergency,” i.e., in
circumstances where there is not sufficient time “to avert the evil by
process of education.” Thus, we see Brandenburg v. Ohio’s formulation
allowing for speech constituting “incitement” to be restricted because
of the likelihood that it will lead to imminent harm.4
Notably, while the marketplace of ideas theory (and its default
response of counterspeech as a remedy for bad speech) accords broad
protection to good and bad ideas, this theory does not accord the same
broad protections to good and bad assertions of fact5 (such as
assertions that one can vote by text or that the election will be held on
Wednesday instead of Tuesday). The Supreme Court, in embracing the
marketplace of ideas theory, has made clear that there is no such thing
as a false idea — that all ideas are protected — but it has also
explained that false statements of fact are not similarly protected.6
While the Court has sometimes recognized the minimal potential
contributions to the marketplace of ideas made by harmless lies7 and
by some incidental/inevitable false statements of fact,8 it has also
emphasized that the First Amendment does not stand in the way of

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1519, 1526 (2019) [hereinafter The Marketplace of Ideas Online].
6 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); Nunziato, The
Marketplace of Ideas Online, supra note 5, at 1526.
7 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 732 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, struck down a portion
of the Stolen Valor Act, a federal law that criminalized the making of false statements
about having a military medal. The Act made it a misdemeanor to falsely represent
oneself as having received any U.S. military decoration or medal and provided for
prison terms up to six months (and up to one year if the subject of such lies was the
Medal of Honor). In a challenge brought by Xavier Alvarez, who was convicted under
the Act for publicly lying about receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor, the Court
struck down the Stolen Valor Act on First Amendment grounds. Justice Kennedy,
writing for a plurality, held that harmless false statements are not, by the sole reason
of their falsity, excluded from First Amendment protection. See also id. at 711 (arguing
that when Alvarez posed as a military medal recipient, this was a seemingly harmless
lie, since this did not hurt anyone and was a lie that could be easily remedied by
counterspeech — if a list of medal recipients were made available on the Internet).
8 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
4
5

regulating intentionally false or misleading assertions of fact.9 In sum,
the predominant marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment
accords broad protection to ideas — even bad ones — and provides
that counterspeech, not censorship, is the default response to harmful
speech consisting of harmful ideas — but this theory does not accord
similarly broad protection to all assertions of fact.
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the importance of
counterspeech as an integral element of our First Amendment
marketplace of ideas model in a number of cases throughout the past
century, even as the mediums for expression have shifted from print
to broadcast to cable to the Internet. In addition, and relatedly, the
Court has recognized the importance of citizens being exposed to and
confronting a diverse array of opinions — including speech with
which they disagree. Although the enablement and prevalence of filter
bubbles on the Internet is a recent development, First Amendment
jurisprudence has long been centered around the importance of
citizens’ exposure to diverse, antagonistic, and competing viewpoints.
In its decisions constitutionalizing the common law of defamation,
for example, the Court has recognized our “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open”10 and accordingly that the default
response to speech critical of public figures is not liability or
retraction/removal, but is instead more speech. As the Court
explained in Gertz v. Welch, “the first remedy available [to targets of
defamation] is self-help – using available opportunities to contradict
the lie or correct the error.”11 This remedy is especially suited to
public officials and public figures, who generally “enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence
have . . . a realistic opportunity to counteract false statements [and
engage in counterspeech].”12
The Court has further recognized the importance of counterspeech
and broad exposure to competing viewpoints in upholding the
9 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society’s
interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues.” (citations
omitted)).
10 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
11 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
12 Id.

“Fairness Doctrine,” a set of regulations that required broadcast
television and radio stations to provide fair coverage to competing
sides of the discussion of public issues and to provide for a
“reasonable opportunity to respond” if “an attack is made on the
honesty, character, integrity, or like personal goals of an identified
person or group.”13 In upholding the constitutionality of the Fairness
Doctrine’s obligations placed upon broadcasters, the Court
emphasized the First Amendment goal of “producing an informed
public capable of conducting its own affairs” and refused to allow
forums in broadcast television or radio to be turned into information
silos monopolized by one side of the debate or the other on
controversial issues of public importance.14 Instead, the Court
recognized the importance of facilitating opportunities for speech and
counterspeech in order for our information ecosystem to produce “an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs.”15
Similarly, in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC,16 the Court
recognized the importance of ensuring that citizens are exposed to
competing and diverse viewpoints. Turner involved a challenge
brought by several cable systems operators to the “must carry”
provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 (the Cable Act).17 The Act required cable
systems operators to carry the signals of local educational public
broadcast television stations, without charge, in the same numerical
channel position as when these programs were broadcast over the
air.18 The Court credited several important government interests that
were advanced by the Act, including a government purpose “of the
highest order in ensuring public access to a multiplicity of information
sources.”19 On this point, the Court explained that “it has long been a
basic tenet of national communications policy that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources
is essential to the welfare of the public.”20 Upholding the Act on
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1969).
Id. at 392.
Id.
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
Id. at 632-34.
See id. at 630-31.
Id. at 663.
Id.

remand, Justice Breyer credited the Act’s purpose of advancing the
national communications policy of protecting “the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources”
and explained that:
[This national communications] policy, in turn, seeks to
facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation,
which, as Justice Brandeis pointed out many years ago,
democratic government presupposes and the First
Amendment seeks to achieve. . . . Indeed, Turner [below]
rested in part upon the proposition that “assuring that the
public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a
governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes
values central to the First Amendment.”21
In its public forum jurisprudence as well, the Court has emphasized
the importance of citizens’ exposure to competing viewpoints,
including diverse, conflicting, and antagonistic ones. In recognizing
the important role that public forums like streets and sidewalks serve
in our First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court recently explained
that:
It is no accident that public streets and sidewalks have
developed as venues for the exchange of ideas. Even today,
they remain one of the few places where a speaker can be
confident that he is not simply preaching to the choir. With
respect to other means of communication, an individual
confronted with an uncomfortable message can always turn
the page, change the channel, or leave the Web site. Not so on
public streets and sidewalks. There, a listener often
encounters speech he might otherwise tune out. In light of the
First Amendment’s purpose “to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,”
this aspect of traditional public fora is a virtue, not a vice.22
21 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226-27 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 663).
22 McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (citation omitted) (quoting FCC
v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)). On this point, see also
Cass Sunstein, who explains that one of the most important functions of the public
forum doctrine is to ensure the opportunity for “shared exposure to diverse speakers

In addition, in the handful of cases in which the Supreme Court has
analyzed the marketplace of ideas and specifically in the Internet
context, it has further recognized the importance of counterspeech
and exposure to diverse viewpoints to our information ecosystem. In
Packingham v. North Carolina, for example, Justice Kennedy
emphasized the important role served by social media platforms in
today’s marketplace of ideas, explaining that they serve as modern
day public forums in which citizens can access, engage with, and
challenge their elected representatives.23 Justice Kennedy specifically
identified Facebook and Twitter as serving these roles, explaining that
Twitter in particular is a forum where “users can petition their elected
representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct manner,”
as “Governors of all 50 States and almost every Member of Congress”
utilize Twitter as a forum in which to engage their constituents.24
Kennedy further noted that social media sites offer “relatively
unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds,” where
users can “engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment
activity on topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’”25 He observed that
the Internet in general and social media in particular are “integral to
the fabric of modern society and culture”26 as they constitute
“principal sources for . . . speaking and listening in the modern public
square, . . . [and are] perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available
to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.”27
Indeed, courts have continued to recognize the importance of social
media platforms as public forums for discussions with public officials
of matters of public importance. In the Trump Twitter blocking case,28
the Second Circuit emphasized in particular the role of social media

with diverse views and complaints.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN
THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 38 (2018). Sunstein explains that in order for us to meet the
demands of citizenship in a deliberative democracy, we must be exposed to a diverse
set of topics and opinions. Id.
23 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1735-36 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
26 Id. at 1738.
27 Id. at 1737.
28 Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir.
2019), vacated and dismissed as moot sub nom. Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at
Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021).

platforms in serving as forums for counterspeech on matters of public
importance. Accordingly, the court refused to allow President Trump
to use his Twitter platform to create a forum only containing speech
that is favorable to him. Trump famously sought to use his Twitter
platform to allow only followers whose comments were favorable to
him and his policies to follow him, while blocking those who criticized
or disagreed with him. Trump made use of his Twitter platform to
share news and announcements of public importance (like the hiring
and firing of officials, the announcement of executive orders, etc.), but
sought to restrict who could follow this account. For example, Trump
used his account to announce his intention to nominate Christopher
Wray for the position of FBI director,29 as well as to remove thenSecretary of State Rex Tillerson,30 then-Secretary of Veterans Affairs
David Shulkin,31 then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper,32 and thenDirector of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(“CISA”) Chris Krebs33 from their respective positions, and to
29 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 7, 2017, 4:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/872419018799550464
[https://perma.cc/
JWH6-9EZR] (“I will be nominating Christopher A. Wray, a man of impeccable
credentials, to be the new Director of the FBI. Details to follow.”).
30 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2018, 5:44 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/973540316656623616
[https://perma.cc/
8TM5-XCTQ] (“Mike Pompeo, Director of the CIA, will become our new Secretary of
State. He will do a fantastic job! Thank you to Rex Tillerson for his service!”).
31 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 28, 2018, 2:31 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/979108846408003584
[https://perma.cc/
73UA-B9BB] (“I am pleased to announce that I intend to nominate highly respected
Admiral Ronny L. Jackson, MD, as the new Secretary of Veterans Affairs . . .”
immediately followed by “. . . In the interim, Hon. Robert Wilkie of DOD will serve as
Acting Secretary. I am thankful to Dr. Shulkin’s service to our country and to our
GREAT VETERANS!”).
32 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 9, 2020, 12:54 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1325859407620689922
[https://archive.is/
mb0Y2] (“. . . Chris will do a GREAT job! Mark Esper has been terminated. I would like
to thank him for his service.”).
33 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 17, 2020, 7:07 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1328852354049957888
[https://archive.

announce that the United States Government would no longer accept
or allow transgender individuals to serve in the military.34 Yet, Trump
sought to allow only favorable followers and favorable Twitter
commentary on such announcements and decisions — and to block
the counterspeech of those who disagreed with him and his policies.
In defending such actions against constitutional attack, he claimed
that his Twitter account was private, not governmental, or in the
alternative, that the interactive comment spaces associated with his
tweets constituted “government speech” immune from scrutiny
under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment — instead of a
public forum in which the citizenry was permitted to counter his
speech with criticisms and comments and diverse and antagonistic
viewpoints.
The Second Circuit disagreed with Trump, and held instead that the
“interactive space” associated with the president’s tweets constituted
a public forum because it was a forum “in which other users may
directly interact with the content of the tweets by . . . replying to,
retweeting or liking the tweet.”35 In holding that the President, by
speaking on Twitter, created a public forum consisting of this
interactive space, the court concluded that Trump’s act of blocking
users from speaking in this space amounted to unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination within a public forum.36 Referencing the
is/1gN5x] (“. . . votes from Trump to Biden, late voting, and many more. Therefore,
effective immediately, Chris Krebs has been terminated as Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.”).
34 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 5:55 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864
[https://perma.cc/
7WRL-TSM6] (“After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be
advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow . . .”); Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonald
Trump/status/890196164313833472
[https://perma.cc/2KA8-ZTAR]
(“. . .
Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military.”).
35 See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 233 (2d
Cir. 2019) (quoting Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp.
3d 541, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)).
36 See id. at 233-34. Of special note is Justice Thomas’s concurrence in the
Supreme Court’s decision vacating the Second Circuit’s decision in this case as moot,
in which Thomas expresses concern not about former President Trump’s ability to
restrict speech on the basis of viewpoint in connection with his Twitter account, but
with Twitter’s far vaster ability to restrict President Trump’s speech on the Twitter

important role played by social media companies like Twitter in
facilitating counterspeech in the online marketplace of ideas, the
court observed:
[W]e write at a time in the history of this nation when the
conduct of our government and its officials is subject to wideopen, robust debate. This debate encompasses an
extraordinarily broad range of ideas and viewpoints and
generates a level of passion and intensity the likes of which
have rarely been seen. This debate, as uncomfortable and as
unpleasant as it frequently may be, is nonetheless a good
thing. In resolving this appeal, we remind the litigants and the
public that if the First Amendment means anything, it means
that the best response to disfavored speech on matters of public
concern is more speech, not less.37

platform — by deplatforming the president and therefore permanently banning him
from communicating with eighty-nine million followers on this platform. As Justice
Thomas observes:
The disparity between Twitter’s control and Mr. Trump’s control [of speech
on the Twitter platform] is stark, to say the least. Mr. Trump blocked several
people from interacting with his messages. Twitter barred Mr. Trump not
only from interacting with a few users, but removed him from the entire
platform, thus barring all Twitter users from interacting with his messages.
Under its terms of service, Twitter can remove any person from the platform
— including the President of the United States — “at any time for any or no
reason.” . . . Today’s digital platforms provide avenues for historically
unprecedented amounts of speech, including speech by government actors.
Also unprecedented, however, is the concentrated control of so much
speech in the hands of a few private parties. . . . The Second Circuit feared
that then-President Trump cut off speech by using the features that Twitter
made available to him. But if the aim is to ensure that speech is not
smothered, then the more glaring concern must perforce be the dominant
digital platforms themselves. As Twitter made clear, the right to cut off
speech lies most powerfully in the hands of private digital platforms. The
extent to which that power matters for purposes of the First Amendment
and the extent to which that power could lawfully be modified raise
interesting and important questions.
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221-27 (2021)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
37 Knight First Amend. Inst., 928 F.3d at 240 (emphasis added).

In short, as forums for speech have evolved in the past century from
print to broadcast to the Internet and social media, the courts have
continued to recognize the preeminent importance of the
marketplace of ideas, of broad exposure to diverse, competing, and
antagonistic viewpoints, and specifically of counterspeech as
essential to “producing an informed public capable of conducting its
own affairs,” and that “the best response to disfavored speech . . . is
more speech, not less.”38
II.

THE VARIETIES OF COUNTERSPEECH FACILITATED ON THE INTERNET

In today’s information ecosystem, the social media platforms
facilitate speech and counterspeech on the Internet on an
unprecedented scale. The platforms do this, first and foremost, by
serving as forums where individuals can speak and respond to one
another’s speech. This occurs notably on social media platforms like
Twitter and Facebook, where users can respond to one another’s
speech and where the default remedy for bad speech, by and large,
continues to be counterspeech not censorship. Although these
platforms host a vast array of speech — including a vast array of
harmful speech — by and large the platforms’ primary response to
harmful speech has not been censorship/removal but rather
counterspeech of one form or another. While the major platforms do
censor some limited categories of harmful speech — and have done
so to a much greater extent in the context of the January 6, 2021,
insurrection at the Capitol — they have generally adhered to First
Amendment values of allowing harmful speech, absent such a
likelihood of imminent harm or emergency, and facilitating
counterspeech as the default response to harmful speech. Because the
major social media platforms wield enormous power over speech in
today’s information ecosystem, those who control such platforms
have expressed reticence to exercise the powers of the censor and
have sought to manifest their commitment to the free speech and
counterspeech ideals on which the First Amendment is premised. For
many years, for example, Twitter characterized itself as “the free

See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969); Knight First Amend.
Inst., 928 F.3d at 240.
38

speech wing of the free speech party”39 and rejected the role of being
the arbiter of truth in the online information ecosystem, deferring
instead to its role of facilitating the marketplace of ideas and
counterspeech as a remedy for bad speech on its platform.40 And
Facebook, for its part, has publicly railed against the idea that it should
be the arbiter of truth on matters of public importance, explaining: “in
a democracy, people should decide what is credible, not tech
companies”41 and “[w]e don’t believe . . . that it’s an appropriate role
for us to referee political debates.”42 Accordingly, the major platforms
generally have sought to limit their censoring/removal interventions
to the most harmful speech — such as speech that incites immediate
violence or harm, constitutes an actual threat of violence,43 or
contains child sex abuse materials — categories of speech that are

39 Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age
of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2260 (2014); Josh Halliday, Twitter’s
Tony Wang: ‘We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech Party,’ GUARDIAN (Mar. 22,
2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-tony-wang-freespeech [https://perma.cc/HV26-QF4H].
40 See Colin Crowell, Our Approach to Bots and Misinformation, TWITTER BLOG (June
14, 2017), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2017/Our-ApproachBots-Misinformation.html [https://perma.cc/K82F-HT3Z] (“Twitter’s open and realtime nature is a powerful antidote to the spreading of all types of false information.
This is important because we cannot distinguish whether every single Tweet from
every person is truthful or not. We, as a company, should not be the arbiter of truth.
[Instead, we look to] journalists, experts and engaged citizens [who] Tweet side-byside correcting and challenging public discourse in seconds.”).
41 See David Klepper, Facebook Clarifies Zuckerberg Remarks on False Political Ads,
AP
NEWS
(Oct.
24,
2019),
https://apnews.com/64fe06acd28145f5913d6f815bec36a2
[https://perma.cc/4GZQ-K37D].
42 See Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-politicalspeech/ [https://perma.cc/Z9VZ-Q6FU] [hereinafter Facebook, Elections and
Political Speech]. Facebook will, however, subject the posts of political action
committees and political advocacy groups to its fact-checking process. Facebook has
explained that while it will not fact-check political ads from candidates, it does
evaluate the accuracy of political ads from political advocacy groups or political action
committees. See Klepper, supra note 41.
43 See Violent Threats Policy, TWITTER (Mar. 2019), https://help.twitter.com/en/
rules-and-policies/violent-threats-glorification
[https://perma.cc/2V9L-27KB]
(discussing Twitter’s policy on violent threats).

likewise unprotected in First Amendment jurisprudence.44 In
addition, the platforms have been more willing to wield their
censoring/removal interventions in the context of harmful and false
assertions of fact (e.g., false information about how or when to vote,
medical misinformation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic). This
too is consistent with First Amendment jurisprudence and the
marketplace of ideas model, which broadly extends protections to
good and bad ideas, but less so to good and bad assertions of fact, as
discussed above. Yet overwhelmingly, the platforms’ predominant
and preferred response to the vast array of “bad” speech on their
platforms had been through the mechanism of counterspeech. This is
particularly true regarding the online speech by public officials,
including President Trump, which the platforms had been quite
reticent to outright censor until the events surrounding Trump’s
incendiary speech inciting the insurrection at the Capitol on January
6, 2021. Prior to the insurrection, the platforms had been much more
inclined to engage in counterspeech in response to harmful speech by
public officials. Along these lines, Twitter had created and
implemented a “public interest” exception45 to its otherwise
applicable rules that would require removal of certain categories of
harmful speech for the tweets of elected and government officials, an
exception that it had justified based on the “significant public interest
in knowing and being able to discuss [elected and government
officials’] actions and statements.”46 The platforms’ former policies

44 In contrast to First Amendment jurisprudence, however, the major social
media platforms generally have taken a much stricter position on restricting hate
speech than under First Amendment law.
45 About
Public-Interest
Exceptions
on
Twitter,
TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/
rules-and-policies/public-interest
(last
visited
Jan.
25,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/KG7Y-QBW4].
46 Id. For example, even though President Trump’s infamous tweet “When the
looting starts, the shooting starts” violated Twitter’s policy prohibiting the
glorification of violence, the tweet was hidden behind a notice claiming it breached
Twitter’s policies on glorifying violence. The tweet could still be viewed and
retweeted with the comment, but could not be liked, replied to, or retweeted
otherwise. See Ryan Browne, Twitter Flags Trump Tweet on Minneapolis for ‘Glorifying
Violence,’
CNBC
(May
29,
2020,
3:46
AM
EST),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/29/twitter-flags-trump-tweet-on-minneapolis-forglorifying-violence.html [https://perma.cc/7EJD-KH38].

embodying a reticence to censor/remove the speech of public officials
(and more broadly, speech in the public interest) was generally
consistent with First Amendment values, in which speech of public
officials and on matters of public importance is within the core of the
First Amendment’s protections.
The counterspeech facilitated by the major social media platforms
comes in a variety of forms. First and foremost, the platforms facilitate
counterspeech by creating and hosting forums for platforms where
people can respond directly or indirectly to one another’s speech.
Twitter and Facebook, for example, create vast opportunities for
counterspeech in the forms of people interacting with one another’s
speech by following or friending one another and interacting with one
another’s speech in a wide variety of ways, such as commenting in
response, retweeting, liking/disliking, etc. While private figure users
can control who they follow and who follows them by blocking,
muting, unfriending and the like (which in turn can lead to problems
for the counterspeech mechanism caused by “filter bubbles”), such
control does not apply to public officials, whose use of social media
platforms like Facebook or Twitter has been held by courts to create
public forum in which followers cannot be blocked on the basis of
their viewpoint.47 This is one area in which First Amendment law has
been successfully invoked to prevent the creation of information silos
or filter bubbles.
Second, the platforms engage in and facilitate counterspeech
themselves, including by (1) labeling speech (with labels determined
by the platforms themselves and/or by working with external fact47 See, e.g., Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d
Cir. 2019) (holding that President Trump’s use of the interactive features of his
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account for government purposes created a limited
public forum in which viewpoint discrimination was prohibited and therefore
Trump’s act of blocking Twitter followers who were critical of him violated the First
Amendment); Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that the Chair
of the Board of Supervisors for Loudoun County, Virginia, Phyllis Randall, created a
limited public forum by using her Facebook page for government purposes and
violated the First Amendment by engaging in unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination when she blocked a constituent from posting on her page because his
comments were critical of her). See generally Dawn Carla Nunziato, From Town
Square to Twittersphere: The Public Forum Doctrine Goes Digital, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH.
L. 1, 43-54 (2019) (discussing and summarizing cases in which government officials’
acts of blocking constituents on social media sites was at issue).

checkers to determine and engage in such labeling); (2) providing and
directing users to authoritative third-party information/external
trusted sources in response to speech; (3) referring speech to external
fact-checkers for evaluation and subsequent labeling; and (4)
referring speech to external fact-checkers/external trusted sources
for evaluation and commissioning the production of responsive
counterspeech (such as Facebook’s “related articles,” discussed
below). Such counterspeech interventions by the platforms have
developed extensively in the past two years and expanded
dramatically in the months leading up to the 2020 presidential
election. Below I analyze in detail these interventions in the context of
political and election-related speech surrounding the 2020
presidential elections, then turn to an analysis of the efficacy of these
counterspeech interventions by the platforms.
III. ELECTION AND POLITICAL SPEECH, “COUNTERSPEECH” RESPONSES, AND
CENSORSHIP OF SUCH SPEECH BY THE MAJOR PLATFORMS
In the time period leading up to and immediately after the 2020
presidential election, the major platforms undertook extensive
measures to check, counter, and, in some extreme circumstances, to
remove election-related misinformation and disinformation. First, the
platforms adopted policies regarding misinformation that they
applied to political and campaign related speech, including policies
applicable to manipulated media such as deepfakes and shallow fakes.
In addition, the platforms enacted extensive policies regarding
misinformation about the logistics of the voting process and the postElection Day announcement of results. The platforms generally
wielded their power consistent with the approach described above,
by censoring/removing only the most egregious and harmful false
posts, while engaging in various forms of counterspeech with respect
to posts deemed less harmful and with respect to posts by
government officials on matters of public importance. The platforms
adopted this approach until the unprecedented actions of former
President Trump and his surrogates in the wake of the 2020 election
and the events surrounding the January 2021 insurrection, as I
examine below. Then, the platforms modified their deferential
approach of generally exempting posts by government officials from
content moderation measures in response to the unprecedented false

and harmful information about the results of the election posted by
former President Trump and his surrogates and in response to
Trump’s posts inciting the insurrection at the Capitol.
A.

Twitter

With respect to manipulated media like deepfakes and shallow
fakes,48 Twitter generally takes the approach of prioritizing
counterspeech or labeling instead of censorship or removal. In
February 2020, Twitter adopted a policy on “synthetic and
manipulated media” that provides: “You may not deceptively share
synthetic or manipulated media that are likely to cause harm”49 and
explained: “we may label Tweets containing synthetic and
manipulated media to help people understand their authenticity and
to provide additional context.”50 Pursuant to this policy, and
consistent with First Amendment values generally, Twitter labels
content that is deceptively altered or fabricated and removes content

48 See Yoel Roth & Ashita Achuthan, Building Rules in Public: Our Approach to
Synthetic
&
Manipulated
Media,
TWITTER BLOG
(Feb.
4,
2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/new-approach-tosynthetic-and-manipulated-media.html [https://perma.cc/HN8B-DKVA]. A deepfake
is a digitally altered “image or recording that has been convincingly altered and
manipulated to misrepresent someone as doing or saying something that was not
actually done or said.” Mark Verstraete, Inseparable Uses, 99 N.C. L. Rev. 456, 459
n.144 (2021); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6.85 (April 2021); Matthew Bodi, The First Amendment
Implications of Regulating Political Deepfakes, 47 Rutgers Comput. & Tech. L.J. 143,
144 (2021); Danielle K. Citron & Robert Chesney, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1759 (2019)
(noting that emergence of generative technology “will enable the production of
altered . . . images, videos, and audios that are more realistic and more difficult to
debunk than they have been in the past”); Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and
Siloed Justices: American Election Law in a “Post-Truth” World, 64 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 535,
542 (2002) (noting that deep fakes “audio and video clips can be manipulated using
machine learning and artificial intelligence and can make . . . anyone else appear to
say or do anything that the manipulator wants”).
49 Roth & Achuthan, supra note 48.
50 Synthetic
and Manipulated Media Policy, TWITTER HELP CTR.,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media (last visited
July 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/MFF5-XMXM].

if it impacts public safety or is likely to cause serious harm.51 Twitter
has already shown, on five separate occasions, that it will place
warnings on posts from President Trump that violate its policies,
including its manipulated media policy.52
In the first case of Twitter applying this new policy, Twitter labeled
as “manipulated media” an edited video featuring then presidential
candidate Joe Biden in which Biden appeared to be endorsing
President Trump for re-election in 2020, which was tweeted by White
House social media director Dan Scavino and retweeted by the
President.53 The video had been edited so as to mislead viewers into
believing that Biden was actually endorsing Trump.54

51 See id. Notably, media that meet all three of the criteria defined above — i.e.,
that are synthetic or manipulated, shared in a deceptive manner, and is likely to cause
harm — may not be shared on Twitter and are subject to removal. Accounts engaging
in repeated or severe violations of this policy may be permanently suspended. Id.
52 Twitter’s first warning labels on Tweets from the President involved
unsubstantiated claims about mail-in ballots being fraudulent, glorifying
violence/use of force, and a manipulated video (discussed further below). See
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter’s Decision to Label Trump’s Tweets Was Two Years in the
Making,
WASH.
POST
(May
29,
2020,
4:55
PM
PDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/05/
29/inside-twitter-trump-label/ [https://perma.cc/N2ST-DE2Z]. Prior to his
suspension, Twitter affixed a warning label to a second Tweet from the President
promoting use of force against protestors, citing its policy regarding “the presence of
a threat of harm against an identifiable group.” Rachel Lerman, Twitter Slaps Another
Warning Label on Trump Tweet About Force, WASH. POST (June 23, 2020, 3:34 PM PDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/23/twitter-slaps-anotherwarning-label-trump-tweet-about-force/ [https://perma.cc/JS2Y-JKNP]. Facebook
left the post up without a warning. Id.
53 See Ivan Mehta, Trump’s Retweet with Doctored Biden Video Earns Twitter’s First
‘Manipulated
Media’
Label,
NEXT
WEB
(Mar.
9,
2020),
https://thenextweb.com/twitter/
2020/03/09/trumps-tweet-with-doctored-biden-video-earns-twitters-firstmanipulated-media-label/ [https://perma.cc/K4BQ-UGN2].
54 Id.

[Image taken from: Dan Scavino (@DanScavino), TWITTER (Mar. 7,
2020,
8:18
PM),
https://twitter.com/DanScavino/status/123646126859
4294785 [https://perma.cc/BQ95-RS4V].]
To better position itself to handle various types of misinformation
relating to the process of voting and in anticipation of misinformation
in connection with the announcement of election results, in May 2020
Twitter enacted and in September 2020 it expanded its Civic Integrity
Policy.
Consistent with its general practice of removing only the most
harmful speech while engaging in counterspeech with respect to less
harmful speech, in accordance with its Civic Integrity Policy, Twitter
adopted a policy of removing/censoring harmful tweets that may lead
to interferences in, manipulation of, or intimidation regarding in the
elections — such as tweets that encourage or threaten violence or call
for people to interfere with election results or with the smooth

operation of polling places — while responding with counterspeech,
primarily in the form of labeling and reference to authoritative
information by trusted sources, to tweets that it deemed less harmful
that implicated election integrity. Pursuant to this policy, Twitter
committed to remove/censor attempts to manipulate or disrupt civic
processes, “including through the distribution of false or misleading
information about the procedures or circumstances around
participation in a civic process,”55 while responding with
counterspeech to what it deems to be less harmful interferences in the
election processes. Referencing this policy, Twitter explains: “In
instances where misleading information does not seek to directly
manipulate or disrupt civic processes, but leads to confusion . . . we
may label the Tweets to give additional context” and may “reduce the
visibility of Tweets containing false or misleading information about
civic processes in order to provide additional context.”
In addition, with respect to the announcement of post-election
results, Twitter adopted a policy of generally engaging in
counterspeech: Twitter’s policy provides that
55 Civic Integrity Policy, TWITTER (Jan. 2021), https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/election-integrity-policy [https://perma.cc/3ZVG-FDWL]. Twitter
includes the following as examples of misleading information about participation in
elections or other civic process:
•
“misleading information about procedures to participate in a civic
process (for example, that you can vote by Tweet, text message, email,
or phone call . . .);
•
misleading information about requirements for participation, including
identification or citizenship requirements;
•
misleading claims that cause confusion about the established laws,
regulations, procedures, and methods of a civic process, or about the
actions of officials or entities executing those civic processes; and
•
misleading statements or information about the official, announced date
or time of a civic process. . . .
•
misleading claims that polling places are closed, that polling has ended,
or other misleading information relating to votes not being counted;
•
misleading claims about police or law enforcement activity related to
voting in an election, polling places, or collecting census information;
•
misleading claims about long lines, equipment problems, or other
disruptions at voting locations during election periods;
•
misleading claims about process procedures or techniques which could
dissuade people from participating; and
•
threats regarding voting locations or other key places or events . . . .”
Id.

[p]eople on Twitter, including candidates for office, may not
claim an election win before it is authoritatively called. To
determine the results of an election in the US, we require
either an announcement from state election officials, or a
public projection from at least two authoritative, national
news outlets that make independent election calls. Tweets
which include premature claims will be labeled and direct
people to our official US election page.56
Twitter reserved for itself the discretion to determine whether to
remove/censor or engage in counterspeech regarding misleading
information about election outcomes, including the discretion to take
some or all of the following measures: (1) apply a label and/or
warning message to the content; (2) show a warning to people before
they share or like the content; (3) reduce the visibility of the content
on Twitter and/or preventing it from being recommended; and/or (4)
provide a link to additional explanations or clarifications, such as in a
“Twitter Moment” (a longer post than a tweet) produced by Twitter
or a link to a Twitter policy (especially where the content is gaining
significant attention or has caused substantial public confusion);
and/or (5) restrict users’ ability to reply, retweet, or like tweets.
In accordance with its Civic Integrity Policy, Twitter reserved for
itself the right to take measures — either removal or counterspeech,
depending on severity and source — in response to misleading
information about election outcomes that was intended to undermine
public confidence in the elections, including “disputed claims that
could undermine faith in the process itself, such as unverified
information about election rigging, ballot tampering, vote tallying, or
certification of election results” and “misleading claims about the
results or outcome of a civic process which calls for or could lead to
interference with the implementation of the results of the process,”
for example, “claiming victory before election results have been

56 Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Additional Steps We’re Taking Ahead of the
2020
US
Election,
TWITTER
BLOG
(Oct.
9,
2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/
company/2020/2020-election-changes.html
[https://perma.cc/G3HT-MEAA]
[hereinafter Additional Steps].

certified, inciting unlawful conduct to prevent the procedural or
practical implementation of election results.”57
Twitter first exercised its discretion under the above policies to
label misleading information by President Trump about mail-in
voting. On October 26, 2020, President Trump issued a tweet claiming
that there were “big problems and discrepancies with Mail In Ballots
all over the USA.” Twitter responded by engaging in the following
types of counterspeech: (1) labeling the tweet as containing disputed
content or as being potentially misleading, (2) creating a fact-check
link below it providing accurate information about mail-in voting
entitled “Voting by mail is legal and safe, experts and data confirm,”
and (3) restricting Twitter users from liking, retweeting, or replying
to the President’s tweet. See below:

These counterspeech efforts were largely the same post-election. As
of October 20, 2020, Twitter began setting its default to Quote Tweet
rather than to Retweet, to encourage users to add their own
counterspeech to the content they were interacting with before
sharing it.58

57
58

Civic Integrity Policy, supra note 55.
See Gadde & Beykpour, Additional Steps, supra note 56.

As opposed to Quote Tweeting, Retweeting was a single-click process
for sharing content to a user’s entire Twitter network.

Twitter provided the following prominent label when a user attempts
to retweet (share) content with warnings like the above, and
characterizes its approach as one of providing additional context:59

Twitter’s actions included the labeling of eleven of twenty-two posts
that President Trump made between November 3 and November 6.60
Anticipating a disputed election, on November 2, Twitter
announced additional election integrity policies that expanded the
criteria for Twitter to add counterspeech in the form of a label, as set
forth below.61
Who is eligible for a label?
•

All accounts with US 2020 candidate labels (including US
2020 Presidential candidate and campaign accounts)

59 Cf. Twitter Safety, Expanding Our Policies to Further Protect the Civic
Conversation,
TWITTER
(Sept.
10,
2020),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/civic-integrity-policyupdate.html [https://perma.cc/X8R6-ULSF] (stating “non-specific, disputed
information that could cause confusion about an election” should be accompanied by
more context and Twitter will start to label any such tweets that “undermine public
confidence in an election or other civic process”).
60 Rachel Sandler, Half of Trump’s Twitter and Facebook Posts Since Election Day
Flagged, FORBES (Nov. 6, 2020, 2:13 PM EST), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
rachelsandler/2020/11/04/over-half-of-trumps-twitter-and-facebook-posts-sinceelection-day-flagged/ [https://perma.cc/RDX7-VT5J].
61 See Gadde & Beykpour, Additional Steps, supra note 56.

•

US-based accounts with more than 100,000 followers

•

Tweets that have significant engagement (25k likes or 25k
Quote Tweets and/or Retweets).

Who do we consider official sources for election results?
•

State election officials (as determined by the National
Association of Secretaries of State and the National Association
of State Election Directors)

National news outlets that have dedicated, independent election
decision desks:
-ABC News
-Associated Press
-CBS News
-CNN
-Decision Desk HQ
-Fox News
-National Election Pool
-NBC News
-Reuters
The week after the election had been called, Twitter said it labeled
300,000 tweets related to the presidential election as disputed.
Twitter also added a warning message and limited engagement
features on 456 of those tweets.62
In the wake of the November 2020 election and of former president
Trump’s repeated false posts about the results of the election and his
increasingly dangerous posts inciting the insurrection at the Capitol
on January 6, 2021, Twitter adopted more aggressive counterspeech
and removal policies. In the post-election period, Twitter attempted

62 Kate Conger, Twitter Says It Labeled 0.2% Of All Election-Related Tweets As
Disputed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/
technology/twitter-says-it-labeled-0-2-of-all-election-related-tweets-asdisputed.html [https://perma.cc/MRH6-D44Q]; Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour,
An Update on Our Work Around the 2020 US Elections, TWITTER BLOG (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://blog.
twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/2020-election-update.html
[https://perma.cc/
A8DF-N4MH].

to slow down the rapidly proliferating misinformation about the
result of the election, election fraud and related conspiracies, and
“stop the steal” movement by carrying out previously announced
election-integrity polices as well as by adding additional
counterspeech and “friction” to the process of engaging with posts —
and ultimately by removing the worst violations and violators from its
platform. In the immediate post-election period, Twitter initially
attempted to contain Trump’s false election claims and the
burgeoning “stop the steal” movement by flagging misinformation
and restricting engagement; adding friction to sharing posts to try to
slow the spread of misinformation; flagging Trump’s false claims and
briefly limiting engagement; and ultimately by removing the worst
offenders. Then, in the period immediately following the insurrection,
Twitter took a number of additional, increasingly drastic measures,
including the suspension of Trump for twelve hours, then eventually
banning him permanently a day later; suspending related accounts
that continued to spread election conspiracies, and purging QAnon
affiliated accounts. I explore each of these measures in greater detail
below.
First, in the immediate wake of Election Day, Twitter placed a
warning label on Trump’s tweets embodying false claims of having
won on Election Night,63 including by imposing labels that required
users to click in order to see the tweet, only permitting quote tweets,
and disabling visible counts of retweets and likes.64 By November 27,
2020, Twitter had flagged over 200 of Trump’s posts as disputed or

63 @TwitterSafety, TWITTER (Nov. 4, 2020, 1:04 AM), https://twitter.com/Twitter
Safety/status/1323868590047744000 [https://perma.cc/DC7Y-BSKC].
64 Geoffrey A. Fowler, Twitter and Facebook Warning Labels Aren’t Enough to Save
Democracy,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
9,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/11/09/facebook-twitter-election-misinformation-labels/
[https://perma.cc/6KPW-N598]. Commenters note how Twitter is more willing to
experiment with product changes to slow the spread of information despite
disruptions to its service than Zuckerberg has expressed Facebook would be.
Zuckerberg is quoted as saying, “[o]nce we’re past these events, and we’ve resolved
them peacefully, I wouldn’t expect that we continue to adopt a lot more policies that
are restricting of a lot more content.” Id.

misleading — which amounted to about thirty percent of all of his
posts since Election Day.65

65 Todd Spangler, Twitter Has Flagged 200 of Trump’s Posts as ‘Disputed’ or
Misleading Since Election Day. Does It Make a Difference?, VARIETY (Nov. 27, 2020, 8:54
AM
PT),
https://variety.com/2020/digital/news/twitter-trump-200-disputedmisleading-claims-election-1234841137/ [https://perma.cc/TEB8-QSCP].

See charts from Washington Post.66
In December, amidst the deluge of misinformation coming from
@realdonaldtrump, Twitter added restrictions to how users could
engage with three of Trump’s flagged tweets. In particular, Twitter
prevented users from liking, retweeting, replying, and copying the
URL. Additionally, counts were disabled and while quote tweets were
permitted after clicking through a warming pop-up, they were
undiscoverable.67
Twitter also temporarily adopted an initiative (which it terminated
on December 16, 2020) that was intended to encourage quote tweets
by adding some “friction” through a prompt that appeared when a

Philip Bump, Twitter Keeps Flagging Trump for Disinformation Because Trump
Keeps Tweeting Disinformation, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2020, 8:17 AM PST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/12/02/twitter-keeps-flaggingtrump-disinformation-because-trump-keeps-tweeting-disinformation/
[https://perma.cc/BS6A-HP4E].
67 Kim Lyons, Twitter Briefly Restricts Trump’s Disputed Election Tweets, VERGE
(Dec.
12,
2020,
10:43
AM
EST),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/12/22171126/trump-twitter-disputedtweets-election-retweets [https://perma.cc/GNJ8-GRHM]. A Twitter spokesperson
said this was inadvertent and the platform reverted back to simply labeling
misinformation. Id.
66

user went retweet a tweet.68 Twitter intended for this approach to
slow down the spread of misinformation by adding an extra step.69
Then, on January 6, 2021, in the immediate wake of the insurrection
after Trump’s tweets condoning and encouraging the violence the
Capitol, Twitter responded to these developments initially by
imposing a twelve-hour suspension on President Trump and by
warning him of a permanent ban in the case of further violations.70 On
January 8, Twitter announced the permanent suspension of
@realDonaldTrump after Trump posted tweets sympathizing with
the insurrectionists and announcing that he would not attend the
Inauguration of President Biden.71 Twitter premised this ban on its
determination that Trump’s tweets could reasonably be interpreted
as encouraging further violence in relation to the Inauguration. In
addition, Twitter banned several Trump-affiliated accounts that
Twitter determined were contributing to and supporting the
insurrection (by sharing conspiracy theories, etc.) and also banned
Trump from using the @POTUS account.72
See id.
See id.
70 Bobby Allyn, Twitter Locks Trump’s Account, Warns of ‘Permanent Suspension’ if
Violations Continue, NPR (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:53 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/
congress-electoral-college-tally-live-updates/2021/01/06/954190994/twitter-lockstrumps-account-warns-of-permanent-suspension-if-violations-continue
[https://perma.cc/G8U8-CUL2].
71 Twitter Inc., Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.html
[https://perma.cc/
72CF-WASV].
72 See, e.g., Jack Brewster, Lin Wood — Lawyer Closely Tied to Trump —
Permanently Banned from Twitter After Claiming Capitol Siege Was ‘Staged,’ FORBES
(Jan.
7,
2021,
1:42
PM
EST),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackbrewster/2021/01/07/lin-wood-lawyerclosely-tied-to-trump-permanently-banned-from-twitter-after-claiming-capitolsiege-was-staged/ [https://perma.cc/A6AL-ZBFL] (permanent suspension of Lin
Wood, @LlinWood, on Jan. 7, 2021 for violating rules against inciting violence and
@FightBackLaw, an account Mr. Wood used to attempt to evade the ban); Brakkton
Booker, My Pillow CEO Mike Lindell Permanently Suspended from Twitter, NPR (Jan. 26,
2021, 10:17 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2021/01/26/960679189/my-pillow-ceomike-lindell-permanently-suspended-from-twitter
[https://perma.cc/WFZ2-4DQ2]
(permanent suspension of Mike Lindell, @realMikeLindell, on Jan. 25, 2021 for repeat
violations of Twitter’s Civic Integrity Policy); Bill Chappell, Twitter Suspends Rep.
Marjorie Taylor Greene’s Account, NPR (Jan. 17, 2021, 5:22 PM ET),
68
69

In the days following the January 6 insurrection, Twitter
additionally reported that it purged over 70,000 accounts affiliated
with QAnon73 (which incidentally resulted in nearly every major GOP
elected official losing a significant number of followers).74

https://www.npr.org/sections/
insurrection-at-the-capitol/2021/01/17/957891462/twitter-suspends-rep-marjorietaylor-greene-s-account-temporarily [https://perma.cc/Q597-EHYR] (temporary
suspension of Marjorie Taylor Green, @mtgreenee, on Jan. 17, 2021); Ben Collins &
Brandy Zadrozny, Twitter Bans Michael Flynn, Sidney Power in Qanon Account Purge,
NBC NEWS (Jan. 8, 2021, 1:28 PM PST), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/technews/twitter-bans-michael-flynn-sidney-powell-qanon-account-purge-n1253550
[https://perma.cc/3F5M-UKGZ] (permanent suspension of Michael Flynn,
@GenFlynn, on Jan. 8, 2021 for sharing Qanon content); id. (permanent suspension of
Sidney Powell, @SidneyPowell1, on Jan. 8, 2021 for sharing QAnon content); Lindsey
Ellefson, Fox News’ Dan Bongino Won’t Return to Twitter After Suspension: ‘F– You,’
WRAP (Jan. 7, 2021, 2:12 PM), https://www.thewrap.com/dan-bongino-quits-twitterafter-suspension/
[https://perma.
cc/L9U5-V39E] (temporary suspension of Dan Bongino, @dbongino, on Jan. 7, 2021
for violating Twitter’s Civic Integrity Policy); Sean Hollister, Twitter Is Deleting
Trump’s Attempts to Circumvent Ban, VERGE (Jan. 8, 2021, 9:50 PM EST),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/8/22221683/trump-tried-to-evade-his-banwith-potus-but-those-tweets-were-instantly-deleted
[https://perma.cc/DLF3-KP7Q]
(permanent suspension of Team Trump, @TeamTrump, on Jan. 8, 2021 for being used
by Trump to attempt to evade his ban); Zen Soo, Twitter Permanently Bans My Pillow
CEO, AP NEWS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trumpmedia-elections-presidential-elections-ac34de7cb5844d96589a10ea6e653d50
[https://perma.cc/7ENE-DA4F] (permanent suspension of My Pillow,
@mypillowusa, on Feb. 1, 2021 for violating Twitter’s policy on ban evasion because
Mike Lindell was using it to post).
73 Tony Romm & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Twitter Purged More than 70,000 Accounts
Affiliated with Qanon Following Capitol Riot, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2021, 6:57 PM
PST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/11/trump-twitterban/ [https://perma.cc/B9RV-NQKJ].
74 Some notable Trump affiliates who lost large amounts of followers include
House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Former
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, Rep. Clay Higgins, who lost fifteen percent
of his entire Twitter following, Rep. Devin Nunez, who lost fifteen percent of his entire
Twitter following, Sen. Kelly Loeffler, who lost ten percent of her entire Twitter
following, Rep. Jim Jordan, Sen. Rand Paul, Rep. Dan Crenshaw, Sen. Ted Cruz, Rep.
Matt Gaetz, Rep. Doug Collins, Sen. Chuck Grassley, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, Dave
Rubin, Bari Weiss, and more. Angela Wang, GOP Politicians Lost Tens of Thousands of
Followers After Twitter Purged Qanon Accounts, Here’s Who Lost the Most., BUS. INSIDER
(Jan. 14, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/gop-officials-lost-mosttwitter-followers-qanon-purge-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/JSU2-WNZ2].

In the post-insurrection period, Twitter updated its policies to
target more deliberately those spreading election conspiracy
theories. Twitter’s January 12, 2021 safety policy updates included
the following measures:
•

Continued/heightened monitoring and reducing the
visibility of those who have posted or engaged with QAnon
or other coordinated harmful activity.

•

Limited engagement on tweets that have been labeled for
violating Twitter’s civic integrity policy.

•

Prevention of certain content from trending, including
tweets with terms that violate Twitter’s rules regarding
Coordinated Harmful Activity, Civic Integrity, Hateful
Conduct, Glorification of Violence, Violent Threats, and/or
Sensitive Media. 75

Finally, in connection with the Inauguration on January 20, 2021,
Twitter adopted certain counterspeech measures by creating an
official inauguration hub populated by coverage from reliable
information sources.76
In short, in the leadup to and in the aftermath of the 2020
presidential election, Twitter adopted an increasingly aggressive
counterspeech policy to combat political and election-related
misinformation on its platform. Twitter then pivoted to a
75 Twitter Safety, An Update Following the Riots in Washington, DC, TWITTER BLOG
(Jan. 12, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/protecting-the-conversation-following-the-riots-in-washington--.html [https://perma.cc/Y5ZR2AF7].
76 @TwitterGov, What to Expect on Twitter on US Inauguration Day 2021, TWITTER
BLOG
(Jan.
14,
2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2021/inauguration-2021.html
[https://perma.cc/NJ5E-W973]. In addition, on Inauguration Day, Twitter carried out
its usual transferring of official White House Twitter accounts and archiving of former
accounts. Posts from @realdonaldtrump have disappeared from Twitter and are now
only accessible through third-party archives. See David Yanofsky, Where to Read
Donald Trump’s Tweets Now that Twitter Has Closed His Account, QUARTZ (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://qz.com/1955036/where-to-find-trumps-tweets-now-that-hes-bannedfrom-twitter/ [https://perma.cc/UBD4-669K]; see also Politwoops, Deleted Tweets
from
Donald
J.
Trump,
R-Fla.,
PROPUBLICA,
https://projects.propublica.org/politwoops/user/real
DonaldTrump (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TCB5-V82Y].

removal/censorship approach only when it determined that the
speech of former President Trump (and that of associated and likeminded speakers) was likely to cause imminent real-world violence.
Twitter continues to experiment with novel approaches to
combatting misleading and harmful speech on its platform. In late
January 2021, Twitter introduced “Birdwatch,” which it describes as
“a community-based approach to misinformation” and which
provides a new vehicle for facilitating counterspeech and combating
harmful speech on its platform.77 Birdwatch allows Twitter to
crowdsource the problem of misinformation on its platform by
enabling ordinary users to engage in counterspeech in the form of
writing “notes” in response to content a user believes is misleading.78
In response, other Twitter users can rate whether such a “note” is
helpful, which in turn factors into Twitter’s determination of the
note’s level of credibility and visibility.79 Such notes will eventually
“travel with” the tweets they are commenting on, so that other Twitter
users can see tweets and corresponding notes side-by-side.80 Twitter
intends for this crowdsourcing effort to help shore up and rebuild
trust in its platform — and its platform’s fact-checking initiatives —
by allowing users themselves to be a part of the fact-checking
process.81 As of this writing, the pilot version of the program in the

77 Keith Coleman, Introducing Birdwatch, a Community-Based Approach to
Misinformation, TWITTER BLOG (Jan. 25, 2021), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/
product/2021/introducing-birdwatch-a-community-based-approach-tomisinformation.
html [https://perma.cc/82UV-ZX9X].
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.; see also FAQs, BIRDWATCH GUIDE, https://twitter.github.io/birdwatch/
about/faq/ [https://perma.cc/Q6P2-8K27] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021) (“Eventually,
we aim to make notes visible directly on Tweets for the global Twitter audience when
there is consensus from a broad and diverse set of contributors.”)
81 Kurt Wagner, Inside Twitter’s Plan to Fact-Check Tweets, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4,
2021, 3:45 AM PST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-0304/birdwatch-inside-twitter-s-plan-to-fact-check-tweets
[https://perma.cc/MEV93HHW] (“Trust in the process and the way this is done is the biggest motivator behind
Birdwatch . . . . We very consistently heard across the political spectrum people saying
that they felt like they would value a community-driven approach, in many cases
more than what Twitter does today.”).

United States has about 2,000 participants82 and is visible only on a
special Twitter Birdwatch site at birdwatch.twitter.com, not on the
main Twitter site.83 Twitter faces a number of challenges in
implementing this novel and ambitious process for facilitating
counterspeech on its platform, including ensuring that the notewriters represent a broad and diverse cross-section of perspectives
from the Twitter community and that the process is not taken over by
coordinated manipulation attempts or other types of abuse or
harassment.84
In sum, consistent with First Amendment values, Twitter generally
opts for responses and interventions in the form of counterspeech
(such as labeling, warnings interposed in users’ processes of sharing
content, references to authoritative sources, and the crowdsourcing
of counterspeech via the Birdwatch program) instead of censorship
— and such counterspeech proved to be moderately effective in
reducing the spread of such misinformation. Notable exceptions
include removal of tweets calling for violence or interference at the
polls, and manipulated media impacting public safety or likely to
cause serious harm, and ultimately the permanent ban on former
President Trump, through which Twitter has prohibited Trump from
ever using its platform again — regardless of whether Trump is ever
re-elected — as a consequence of Trump’s speech inciting violence in
the context of the insurrection at the Capitol.
B.

Facebook

Facebook has also adopted a host of policies to address potentially
harmful political and election-related misinformation. First, Facebook
adopted policies regarding misinformation about the voting process
and the post-election announcement of election results. Second,
Facebook adopted policies regarding misinformation that is
applicable to political and campaign related speech generally.
82 Elizabeth Culliford, Twitter’s Birdwatch Crowd Experiment Courts Familiar
Challenges, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2021, 4:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ustwitter-moderation-birdwatch-focus/twitters-birdwatch-crowd-experimentcourts-familiar-challenges-idUSKBN2BB13A [https://perma.cc/M7QY-LLYA].
83 BIRDWATCH, https://twitter.com/i/birdwatch (last visited Apr. 14, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/CUZ3-8MHT].
84 BIRDWATCH GUIDE, supra note 80.

In preparation for the 2020 presidential election, Facebook adopted
policies to address voter suppression and intimidation, as well as
policies regarding election results announcements.85 Pursuant to
these policies, Facebook removed content that was directed to
suppressing votes or intimidating voters, including posts that
contained any of the following false assertions of fact (regardless of
their source):
•

Misrepresentation of the dates, locations, times and
methods for voting or voter registration (e.g., “Vote by
text!”);

•

Misrepresentation of who can vote, qualifications for voting,
whether a vote will be counted and what information
and/or materials must be provided in order to vote (e.g., “If
you voted in the primary, your vote in the general election
won’t count.”); and

•

Threats of violence relating to voting, voter registration or
the outcome of an election.86

In addition, Facebook adopted policies under which it bans
advertising that suggests that voting is useless or meaningless or
advises people not to vote. Regarding election result announcements,
Facebook adopted a policy of directing users to its Voting Information
Center for real-time vote-counting results and applying warnings to
posts claiming election victory prematurely.87
Applying its voter suppression and intimidation policies, Facebook
responded with counterspeech/labeling to eleven of twenty-two
posts President Trump made between November 3 and November 6
regarding the outcome of the election. In addition, on November 5,
Facebook shut down a group with over 300,000 users called “Stop the
Steal” that was organizing protests claiming Joe Biden was trying to
steal the election. Facebook labeled these posts and referred users to

85 Guy Rosen, Preparing for Election Day, FACEBOOK (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/10/preparing-for-election-day/
[https://perma.cc/87RQ-W5VS].
86 Id.
87 Id.

accurate and truthful information regarding the outcome of the
election.
Facebook’s labeling and other counterspeech measures were
apparently somewhat less effective than those of Twitter. Third-party
estimates of the efficacy of Facebook’s approach suggest that it led to
only an eight percent decrease in the sharing of this false post.88 By
comparison, Twitter’s warning of misinformation prior to permitting
sharing reduced shares by nearly thirty percent, as noted above, and
Facebook’s own practice of fact-checking, as opposed to merely
directing users to authoritative content, reduced the spread of content
by eighty percent once labeled as false. As a matter of company policy,
Facebook does not fact-check politicians.89
Facebook has taken a number of steps to combat misinformation in
general on its platform.90 Consistent with its general approach of
favoring
counterspeech/labeling
over
censorship/removal,
Facebook’s efforts to combat misinformation have trended toward
labeling and fact-checking, rather than removal. The company has
adopted extensive measures to attempt to combat publicly-available
misinformation on its platform, including by partnering with
independent third-party fact-checkers to evaluate posts and
providing counterspeech in the form of “Related Articles”/”Additional
Reporting on This” on topics similar to false or misleading posts.91
These extensive measures to combat misinformation and false
content on Facebook are generally applicable to political content and
88 Brianna Provenzano, Facebook Knows that Labeling Trump’s Election Lies Hasn’t
Stopped His Posts from Going Viral, GIZMODO (Nov. 16, 2020, 8:24 PM),
https://gizmodo.com/facebook-knows-that-labeling-trumps-election-lies-I1845693925 [https://perma.cc/JAR8-22S6].
89 Craig Silverman & Ryan Mac, Facebook Knows that Adding Labels to Trump’s
False Claims Does Little to Stop Their Spread, BUZZFEED (Nov. 16, 2020, 8:07 PM ET),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/facebook-labels-trumplies-do-not-stop-spread [https://perma.cc/GP2T-ST85].
90 See Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: What’s Facebook’s Strategy for Stopping False
News?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (May 23, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/
05/hard-questions-false-news
[https://perma.cc/9D5P-7CBA]
[hereinafter
Facebook’s Strategy].
91 See, e.g., Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow & Chuan Yu, Trends in the Diffusion of
Misinformation on Social Media Online Appendix 4 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy
Research, Working Paper No. 18-029, 2018), http://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/
research/fake-news-trends-appx.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2X9-D276] (listing in
Table 1 all of Facebook’s efforts to combat false news).

political ads, but are not applicable to posts that are considered
“direct speech by a politician.”92 Thus, under Facebook’s currently
applicable fact-checking policies, political speech and the content of
political ads are subject to fact-checking — except if such content
constitutes “direct speech by a politician.”93 This exception for
politicians’ content has come under substantial scrutiny in recent
months, especially given the highly controversial posts of President
Trump.94 Before examining this controversial exception to Facebook’s
general labeling/fact-checking/counterspeech policy for public posts
on its platform, I first examine the company’s generally-applicable
policy itself.
Over the past four years, Facebook has expanded the partnership it
began in December 2016 with fact-checkers to evaluate publiclyavailable content posted on its platform.95 Through its fact-checking
initiatives, Facebook works with select independent third-party factcheckers, which are certified through the non-partisan International
Fact-Checking Network.96 In the United States, the certified factchecking organizations with whom Facebook works are the
Associated Press, factcheck.org, Lead Stories, Check Your Fact, Science
Feedback, and PolitiFact.97 Facebook has expanded its general fact92 Program Policies, FACEBOOK BUS. HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.com/
business/help/315131736305613
(last
visited
Sept.
4,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/8JWX-WTFA].
93 Id.
94 See Michael M. Grynbaum & Tiffany Hsu, CNN Rejects 2 Trump Campaign Ads,
Citing
Inaccuracies,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
3,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/
business/media/cnn-trump-campaign-ad.html
[https://perma.cc/2TSS-XXU9];
Cecilia Kang, Facebook’s Hands-Off Approach to Political Speech Gets Impeachment
Test,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/technology/facebook-trump-bidenad.html [https://perma.cc/AM92-AC2D].
95 See Lyons, Facebook’s Strategy, supra note 90.
96 Id.; see also Verified Signatories of the IFCN Code of Principles, POYNTER,
https://ifcncodeofprinciples.poynter.org/signatories (last visited Sept. 12, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/JL6K-DGJE].
97 See Mike Ananny, Checking in with the Facebook Fact-Checking Partnership,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/tow_center/facebookfact-checking-partnerships.php [https://perma.cc/R5YC-ZVNT]; see also FactChecking
on
Facebook,
FACEBOOK
HELP
CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/

checking initiative to include the fact-checking of all public,
newsworthy Facebook posts, including links, articles, photos, and
videos.98 The fact-checking process on Facebook applies to political
advertisements unless those advertisements (or other posts)
constitute “direct speech made by an elected official.”99 The factchecking process can be initiated by Facebook users who flag a post
as being potentially false. Subject to the exception for direct speech by
politicians, any public, newsworthy post (including text, photos, and
videos) can be flagged for fact-checking, either by a user, by an outside
journalist, or, as is most commonly the case, by Facebook’s machine
learning algorithms. For a user to flag a post as potentially false, a user
clicks “•••” next to the post he or she wishes to flag as false, then clicks
“Report post,” then clicks “It’s a false news story,” then clicks “Mark
this post as false news.”100
Once a post is flagged by a user, journalist, or Facebook’s machine
learning as a potential false news story, it is submitted for evaluation
to a third-party independent fact-checker.101 For each piece of content

182222309230722 (last visited July 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LQ5G-W38R]
(providing an overview of Facebook’s fact-checking program); How Are Independent
Fact-Checkers Selected on Facebook?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://www.facebook.
com/help/1599660546745980
(last
visited
Sept.
29,
2018)
[https://perma.cc/M5UK-Q2C7] (explaining how a third-party becomes a factchecker for Facebook). Notably, Facebook had added The Weekly Standard to these
ranks for a period of time in an attempt to respond to critics who claimed that its factchecking program was politically biased, but this publication is now defunct.
98 See Antonia Woodford, Expanding Fact-Checking to Photos and Videos, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Sept. 13, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/09/expandingfact-checking [https://perma.cc/9V6C-LHPH].
99 “If a claim is made directly by a politician on their Page, in an ad or on their
website, it is considered direct speech and ineligible for our third party fact checking
program — even if the substance of that claim has been debunked elsewhere.” See
Program Policies, supra note 92.
100 See How Do I Mark a Facebook Post as False News?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/572838089565953 (last visited Sept. 29, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/VSQ3-SRGR]. Alternatively, a user can click “•••” next to a post,
then click “Find Support or Report Post,” and then select “False News.” Id.
101 See Tessa Lyons, Hard Questions: How Is Facebook’s Fact-Checking Program
Working?,
FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM
(June
14,
2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/06/
hard-questions-fact-checking/
[https://perma.cc/SD33-3YWT]
[hereinafter
Facebook’s Fact-Checking] (“[W]hen people on Facebook submit feedback about a

up for review, a fact-checker has the option of providing one of six
different ratings: false, altered, partly false, missing context, satire, or
true.102 If a third-party fact-checker has determined that a post is false,
Facebook then initiates several steps. First, Facebook deprioritizes
false posts in users’ News Feeds, i.e., the constantly updating list of
stories in the middle of a user’s home page (including status updates,
photos, videos, links, app activity, and likes), such that future views of
each false post will be reduced by an average of eighty percent.103
Second, Facebook may commission a fact-checker to write a “Related
Article” or “Additional Reporting on This” setting forth truthful
information about the subject of the false post and the reasons why
the fact-checker rated the post as false.104 Such content is then
displayed in conjunction with the false post on the same subject.105
While Facebook formerly flagged false news sites with a “Disputed”
flag, the company is experimenting with different approaches in
response to research suggesting that such flags may actually entrench
beliefs in the disputed posts.106 Facebook now provides “Related
Articles”/”Additional Reporting on This” in conjunction with false
news stories, which apparently does not result in similar
story being false or comment on an article expressing disbelief, these are signals that
a story should be reviewed.”).
102 Rating
Options
for
Fact-Checkers,
FACEBOOK BUS. HELP CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/business/help/341102040382165 (last visited Aug.
28, 2020) [https://perma.cc/4ZKY-BVWW].
103 Lyons, Facebook’s Fact-Checking, supra note 100; see also Tessa Lyons,
Increasing Our Efforts to Fight False News, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 21, 2018),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/06/increasing-our-efforts-to-fight-falsenews/ [https://perma.cc/Z9GK-GAJ2].
104 See Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags with Related Articles, FACEBOOK
NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feedfyi-updates-in-our-fight-against-misinformation
[https://perma.cc/DA48-UBPE]
[hereinafter Disputed Flags].
105 Geoffrey A. Fowler, I Fell for Facebook Fake News. Here’s Why Millions of You Did
Too., WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018, 1:58 PM PDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2018/10/18/i-fell-facebook-fake-news-heres-why-millions-you-didtoo/ [https://perma.cc/YJ9T-DF64] (describing steps undertaken by Facebook to
respond to fake video, including posting “Additional Reporting on This,” with links to
reports from fact-checking organizations); Lyons, Disputed Flags, supra note 104; see
also Sara Su, New Test with Related Articles, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/04/news-feed-fyi-new-test-with-relatedarticles [https://perma.cc/7SR6-L3H5].
106 See Lyons, Disputed Flags, supra note 104.

entrenchment.107 In addition, users who attempt to share the false
post will be notified that the post has been disputed and will be
informed of the availability of a “Related Article”/”Additional
Reporting on This,” as will users who earlier shared the false post,108
as in the example below (setting forth Facebook and Instagram’s
flags).109

107 See id. (explaining that “[a]cademic research on correcting misinformation has
shown that putting a strong image, like a red flag, next to an article may actually
entrench deeply held beliefs . . . [but that] Related Articles, by contrast, are simply
designed to give more context, which our research has shown is a more effective way
to help people get to the facts. . . . [W]e’ve found that when we show Related Articles
next to a false news story, it leads to fewer shares than when the Disputed Flag is
shown”).
108 See id.
109 E.g., Elle Hunt, ‘Disputed by Multiple Fact-Checkers’: Facebook Rolls Out New
Alert to Combat Fake News, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2017, 8:37 PM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/22/facebook-fact-checkingtool-fake-news [https://perma.cc/L4KM-L925].

[Image taken from: Karissa Bell, Instagram adds ‘false information’
labels to prevent fake news from going viral, MASHABLE (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://mashable.com/article/instagram-false-information-labels/
[https://perma.cc/H758-4QUV].]
In addition, as Facebook explains: “When fact-checkers write
articles with more information about a story, you’ll see a notice where
you can click to see why.”110 Facebook also provides its users who are
about to share posts that have been debunked by a fact-checker by
alerting them to additional reporting.111 Facebook also now posts
more prominent fact-checking labels as interstitials warnings atop
110 How Is Facebook Addressing False Information Through Independent FactCheckers?,
FACEBOOK
HELP
CTR.,
https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536 (last visited July 21, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/7BQ8-BZ2V].
111 Id.

photos and videos on Facebook (and Instagram) that were factchecked as false.
Facebook’s general false news policy, composed of the fact-checking
process and counterspeech mechanisms described above, is not
applicable to “direct speech” by politicians. Such direct speech by
politicians is not run through Facebook’s external fact-checking
process nor subject to labeling or the commissioning of
counterspeech in response.112 Facebook proffers the following
justification for this exception to its fact-checking policy:
We rely on third-party fact-checkers to help reduce the spread
of false news and other types of viral misinformation, like
memes or manipulated photos and videos. We don’t believe,
however, that it’s an appropriate role for us to referee political
debates and prevent a politician’s speech from reaching its
audience and being subject to public debate and scrutiny . . . .
This means that we will not send organic content or ads from
politicians to our third-party fact-checking partners for
review.113
Posts and ads that constitute “direct speech” from current
“politicians” at any/every level and their appointees — i.e., the
politician’s own claim or statement — are not subjected to factchecking — even if the substance of the claim has been debunked
elsewhere.114
Facebook’s decision not to submit direct speech from current
politicians to fact-checking is apparently grounded in the belief that
such political speech is already subject to sufficient scrutiny among
the polity and the free press and should not be subject to further
scrutiny by Facebook’s fact-checkers.115 Facebook further justifies its
policies as follows: “In a democracy, people should decide what is
See Program Policies, supra note 92.
Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, supra note 42 (emphasis added).
Facebook will, however, subject the posts of political action committees and political
advocacy groups to its fact-checking process. Klepper, supra note 41.
114 Kate Cox, Political Ads Can Lie If They Want, Facebook Confirms, ARS TECHNICA (Oct.
10, 2019, 9:55 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/10/political-ads-canlie-if-they-want-facebook-confirms/ [https://perma.cc/P8N7-HYWT]; Fact-Checking
on Facebook, supra note 97.
115 Program Policies, supra note 92.
112
113

credible, not tech companies . . . . That’s why - like other internet
platforms and broadcasters - we don’t fact check ads from
politicians.”116 As a result, political speech and political ads made by
politicians themselves — posts and campaign ads by politicians —
operate in a separate system on Facebook.
Facebook’s decision not to screen for or remove false posts or ads
by politicians came into sharp focus in October 2019, when President
Donald Trump’s reelection campaign began running an ad that was
proven to be false about then presidential candidate Joe Biden on
Facebook.117 The Trump Campaign released a thirty-second video ad
accusing Biden of promising Ukraine money in exchange for firing a
prosecutor investigating a company with ties to Biden’s son, Hunter
Biden.118 The video ad falsely claimed that Joe Biden offered Ukraine
$1 billion in aid if Ukraine pushed out the official investigating a
company tied to Hunter Biden.119 The Biden campaign asked
Facebook to take down the ad, but Facebook refused.120 In justifying
its refusal, Facebook’s head of global elections policy Katie Harbath
explained: “Our approach is grounded in Facebook’s fundamental
belief in free expression, respect for the democratic process, and the
belief that, in mature democracies with a free press, political speech
is already arguably the most scrutinized speech there is.”121
Accordingly, the false Trump Campaign ad on Biden remained
available on Facebook.
Facebook has encountered strong opposition to its policy
exempting politicians’ (and especially President Trump’s) posts from
fact-checking and from other of the company’s content policies as
well, including those prohibiting threats of imminent violence. One
particular flashpoint at issue involved violent speech in the form of
Donald Trump’s May 2020 post following the murder of George Floyd
Klepper, supra note 41 (quoting Facebook’s company statement).
See Amy Sherman, Donald Trump Ad Misleads About Joe Biden, Ukraine, and the
Prosecutor, POLITIFACT (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2019/oct/
11/donald-trump/trump-ad-misleads-about-biden-ukraine-and-prosecut/
[https://perma.cc/
UY87-LN9S].
118 Grynbaum & Hsu, supra note 94.
119 Id.
120 Kang, supra note 94.
121 Id.
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117

and the ensuing demonstrations.122 Trump threatened to deploy the
military in Minneapolis to “bring the City under control” and
infamously stated “when the looting starts, the shooting starts.”123

[Image taken from: Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(May 29, 2020, 12:53 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1266231100780744704 [https://perma.cc/9DCM-9F7G].]
President Trump made this post across several platforms. While
Twitter appended a notice to the President’s post explaining that the
post violated the platform’s rules against glorifying violence and
requiring users to click through the notice to view the tweet (see
below), Facebook took no action.124
122 See Megan Rose Dickey & Taylor Hatmaker, Facebook Employees Stage Virtual
Walkout in Protest of Company’s Stance on Trump Posts, TECHCRUNCH (June 1, 2020,
10:01 AM PDT), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/01/facebook-employees-stagevirtual-walkout-in-protest-of-companys-stance-on-trump-posts/
[https://perma.cc/64V4-482Y].
123 Id.
124 See Brian Stelter & Donie O’Sullivan, Trump Tweets Threat that ‘Looting’
Will Lead to ‘Shooting.’ Twitter Put a Warning Label on It, CNN (May 29, 2020,
10:40 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/29/tech/trump-twitterminneapolis/index.html [https://perma.cc/W7JV-YE62] (including a screenshot of
the notice Twitter posted in response to Trump’s tweet).

[Image taken from: Twitter Comms (@TwitterComms), TWITTER (May
29, 2020, 3:17 AM), https://twitter.com/TwitterComms/status/
1266267447838949378 [https://perma.cc/6MZD-BYHA].]
Facebook’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg explained that he was personally
appalled by the President’s tweet, but felt that Facebook’s
institutional role was to “enable as much expression as possible
unless it will cause imminent risk of specific harms or dangers spelled
out in [Facebook’s] clear policies.”125 Some of Facebook’s employees,
however, voiced dissatisfaction with the company’s response.126
Facebook ultimately retreated from its non-interventionist stance
towards Donald Trump and his campaign, at least with respect to its
hate speech content regulation, and subsequently removed a Trump
Campaign page ad because of its use of a symbol of hate.127 In addition,
125 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (May 29, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/
posts/10111961824369871 [https://perma.cc/7JQX-KRGT].
126 Rachel Siegel & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Employees Blast Zuckerberg’s
Hands-Off Response to Trump Posts as Protests Grip Nation, WASH. POST (June 1, 2020,
5:04 PM PDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/06/01/facebookzuckerberg-donation-trump/ [https://perma.cc/Q7SE-Q9JG].
127 Isaac Stanley-Becker, Facebook Removes Trump Ads with Symbol Once Used by
Nazis to Designate Political Prisoners, WASH. POST (June 18, 2020, 12:48 PM PDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/06/18/trump-campaign-runs-

Facebook recently announced that it would “remove posts [from
political leaders] that incite violence or attempt to suppress voting . . .
[and] affix labels on posts that violate hate speech prohibitions.”128
Facebook’s decision to exempt speech by politicians from its factchecking and other content regulation policies also drew sharp
criticism recently. Civil rights and liberties leader Laura W. Murphy,
along with a team from civil rights law firm Relman Colfax, conducted
an extensive, independent two-year civil rights audit of Facebook’s
content regulation policies and their implementation.129 The auditors’
concerns were magnified by Facebook’s response to President
Trump’s posts regarding recent civil rights protests and mail-in
ballots in the context of the pandemic.130 The auditors expressed
strong criticisms of the company’s policies and exemption of Trump’s
posts from its content regulation policies and voiced particular
concern about the ramifications of this exemption for our political
process:
[W]e have grave concerns that the combination of
[Facebook’s] decision to exempt politicians from factchecking and the precedents set by its recent decisions on
President Trump’s posts, leaves the door open for the
platform to be used by other politicians to interfere with
voting. If politicians are free to mislead people about official
voting methods (by labeling ballots illegal or making other
ads-with-marking-once-used-by-nazis-designate-political-prisoners/
[https://perma.cc/Y96D-M5MS]. Days later when a Trump-affiliated campaign page
posted an advertisement denouncing “dangerous MOBS” accompanied by an image of
a downward facing red triangle, Facebook deactivated those ads because the image
was the same symbol used by the Nazis to denote political prisoners in its
concentration camps. Id. Facebook representatives stated that the ad violated a policy
against using a “banned hate group’s symbol[s]” outside of a condemnatory context
or as an object for discussion. Id.
128 Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Silicon Valley Is Getting Tougher on Trump
and His Supporters over Hate Speech and Disinformation, WASH. POST (July 10, 2020,
10:53 AM PDT), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/10/hatespeech-trump-tech/ [https://perma.cc/XE86-62KN].
129 See LAURA W. MURPHY, STEPHEN HAYES, ERIC SUBLETT, ALEXA MILTON, TANYA SEHGAL,
ZACHARY BEST & MEGAN CACACE, FACEBOOK’S CIVIL RIGHTS AUDIT – FINAL REPORT 5 (2020),
https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Civil-Rights-Audit-FinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HMU-FYC7].
130 Id. at 37-38.

misleading statements that go unchecked, for example) and
are allowed to use not-so-subtle dog whistles with impunity
to incite violence against groups advocating for racial justice,
this does not bode well for the hostile voting environment that
can be facilitated by Facebook in the United States. We are
concerned that politicians, and any other user for that matter,
will capitalize on the policy gaps made apparent by the
president’s posts and target particular communities to
suppress the votes of groups based on their race or other
characteristics. . . . [T]his is deeply troublesome as
misinformation, sowing racial division and calls for violence
near elections can do great damage to our democracy.131
The concerns of the auditors turned out to be well-founded, as we
now know. Calls for violence near the elections did in fact do great
damage to our democracy, and Facebook attempted to belatedly
modify its policies to address the grave harms resulting from the
dangerous political speech on its platform. In the post-election period,
Facebook attempted to slow down the rapidly proliferating election
fraud conspiracies and “stop the steal” movement by adding “friction”
to engaging with posts, removing the worst violations, and carrying
out previously announced election-integrity policies. As I describe in
greater detail below, in the period directly after the November
election, Facebook initially responded to Trump’s false election claims
and the burgeoning “stop the steal” movement by adding counterinformation to newsfeeds and directing users to official news sources;
labeling the worst misinformation cases, including the President’s
false claims of victory, and banning the largest “stop the steal”
Facebook group and related hashtags. Then, in the run up to the
insurrection, Facebook extended its temporal ban on political ads,
with an exception for the Georgia Senate Runoffs. Finally, after
January 6, 2021, Facebook banned Trump indefinitely, announced
additional measures to identify and remove content encouraging
further incitement of violence, and continued its efforts to combat
militarized social movements and to restrict the use of the platform to
organize attacks. I detail these efforts below.
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First, in the period directly after the election, Facebook turned to
counterspeech remedies by adding a notification on top of Facebook
and Instagram feeds stating that no winner had been projected for the
2020 Election after former President Trump falsely claimed victory
on election night.132 Facebook also labeled Trump’s post claiming
victory directing users to news sources Facebook deems credible.133
These labels were applied to both presidential candidates and other
high-profile users in regard to premature declarations of victory or
election misinformation.134 Additionally, Facebook amended its News
Feed algorithm to prioritize authoritative news sources like NPR,
CNN, and The New York Times over overtly partisan outlets like
Breitbart or Occupy Democrats based on “news ecosystem quality”
scores (“NEQ”).135 In addition, forty-eight hours after the election and
about twenty-four hours before CNN called the 2020 Election for
President Biden, Facebook banned a group of over 350,000 members,
many of whom claimed that Democrats were “stealing” the election
and some who called for violence.136 This group was just one of many
smaller groups fostering the same sentiments and promoting similar
activities.137 However, this particular group that was shut down had
See Facebook Newsroom (@fbnewsroom), TWITTER (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:00 AM),
https://twitter.com/fbnewsroom/status/1323897798421442566
[https://perma.cc/7ZF7-GVFB].
133 See id.
134 See Facebook Newsroom (@fbnewsroom), TWITTER (Nov. 4, 2020, 1:18 PM),
https://twitter.com/fbnewsroom/status/1324098616911343617
[https://perma.cc/9P3S-XAMQ]; see also Rachel Kraus, Facebook Labeled 180 Million
Posts as ‘False’ Since March. Election Misinformation Spread Anyway, MASHABLE (Nov.
19, 2020), https://mashable.com/article/facebook-labels-180-million-posts-false/
[https://perma.
cc/Z8TD-QQK2].
135 Kevin Roose, Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Struggles to Balance
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N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
24,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/24/
technology/facebook-election-misinformation.html
[https://perma.cc/3B2QCRWD].
136 Barbara Ortutay & David Klepper, Facebook Bans Big ‘Stop the Steal’ Group for
Sowing Violence, AP NEWS (Nov. 5, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/election-2020donald-trump-misinformation-violence-electionsd5c9bd5fe6a799fd627c50521b6cbb36
[https://perma.
cc/64BF-XY37].
137 Id.
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amassed 320,000 of its followers within twenty-two hours of its
creation the day after the election.138 Groups like Women For America
First (100,000 followers within a few hours), run by former Georgia
congressional candidate Amy Kremer, urged users to join the “Stop
the Steal” group. A common goal of these groups was to promote
protest efforts in swing states like Pennsylvania and Arizona to
disrupt the ongoing vote-counting.139 In a statement, Facebook
spokesperson Andy Stone cited the organized effort around
delegitimizing the election and calls for violence in the group “during
this period of heightened tension” for its decision to ban the group.
Additionally, Facebook stated it would suppress the distribution of
election-related livestreams and content related to “stop the steal”
efforts — including through banning related hashtags.140 However,
numerous Facebook events for “stop the steal” protest events
remained active and several “stop the steal” videos had already gone
viral. Dozens of smaller “stop the steal” groups began appearing after
the “flagship” group had been removed.141 In addition, posts
encouraging members of “stop the steal” groups to visit
StolenElection.us, which directed users to join a mailing list, had
already been circulated.142
In addition, Facebook initially stopped running all “social issue,
electoral or political ads” at noon on Wednesday, November 4,

138 Sheera Frenkel, The Rise and Fall of the ‘Stop the Steal’ Facebook Group, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/technology/stop-thesteal-facebook-group.html [https://perma.cc/8Y9W-PT89].
139 Tony Romm, Isaac Stanley-Becker & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook Bans ‘STOP
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140 Id. (noting that Facebook spokesperson Andy Stone called these steps
“exceptional measures that we are taking during this period of heightened tension.
The group was organized around the delegitimization of the election process, and we
saw worrying calls for violence from some members of the group”).
141 Frenkel, supra note 138.
142 Makena Kelly, Facebook Shuts Down Huge ‘Stop the Steal’ Group, VERGE (Nov. 5,
2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/5/21551551/facebook-stopthe-steal-group-misinformation-election-2020 [https://perma.cc/732L-GUZE].

2020.143 Responding to public criticism, Facebook made an exception
to its political ad ban “with the purpose of reaching voters in Georgia
about Georgia’s runoff elections” starting December 16, 2020.144
Advertisers directly involved with the elections (campaigns, local
election officials, and official political parties) were prioritized while
ads targeting locations outside of Georgia and debunked by thirdparty fact-checkers were prohibited. This was lifted on January 5,
2021 after the elections were completed.145 On November 11,
Facebook announced an extension of the “pause” to last another
month, “though there may be an opportunity to resume these ads
sooner.”146 It linked to Facebook executive Rob Leathern’s tweets for
more information.147 The platform’s extension of its ad ban was likely
intended to prevent President Trump and his allies from using paid
advertising to promote their baseless election fraud claims and
attempts to dispute the results.148
Later, after Twitter took steps to restrict Trump’s access in the wake
of the January 6 siege on the Capitol, Facebook announced that Trump
wouldn’t be able to post for twenty-four hours. On January 7, 2021,
Facebook announced that it would be extending the block on his

143 U.S. Reminders for When the Polls Close, FACEBOOK FOR GOV’T, POL. & ADVOC. (Nov.
2, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/gpa/blog/reminders-for-when-the-polls-close
[https://perma.cc/4983-FQUS].
144 Sarah Schiff, An Update on the Georgia Runoff Elections, FACEBOOK (Dec. 15,
2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/12/update-on-the-georgia-runoffelections/ [https://perma.cc/KX8M-EF6T].
145 Id.
146 Id.; 5 Things to Remember About Political and Issue Advertising Around the US
2020 Election, FACEBOOK FOR BUS. (Nov. 11, 2020, 2:45 PM),
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[https://perma.cc/8K4X7GXN].
147 Id.; see Rob Leathern (@robleathern), TWITTER (Nov. 11, 2020, 1:37 PM),
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[https://perma.cc/49PK-3RDV].
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VERGE
(Nov.
11,
2020,
1:25
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/11/11/21560
969/facebook-political-ad-ban-extended-trump-2020-election-concedemisinformation [https://perma.cc/G3EE-ML2N].

accounts indefinitely, for a minimum of two weeks.149 Mark
Zuckerberg personally posted a statement on the decision on his own
Facebook page.150 After placing labels on the posts, Facebook and
Instagram eventually removed the video of Mr. Trump condoning the
violence and continuing to spread election falsities.151 On January 21,
2021, Facebook asked the recently constituted Facebook Oversight
Board to rule on Facebook’s decision to suspend Trump from its
platform.152 The Oversight Board held in May 2021 that, given the
seriousness of Trump’s violations of Facebook’s Community
Standards and the ongoing risk of violence they presented, Facebook
was justified in suspending Mr. Trump’s accounts on January 6, but
that it was not appropriate for Facebook to impose an unprecedented
indefinite suspension, in the absence of any clear, regular, published
procedure for imposing such an indefinite suspension.153
In Facebook’s January 2021 statement announcing the restrictions
on Trump, the platform announced that it would identify and remove
content containing, among other content:
•

“Praise and support of the storming of the US Capitol . . .

149 Guy Rosen, Our Response to the Violence in Washington, FACEBOOK (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://about.fb.com/news/2021/01/responding-to-the-violence-inwashington-dc/ [https://perma.cc/42LZ-YC3J] [hereinafter Our Response].
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•

Incitement or encouragement of the events at the Capitol,
including videos and photos from the protestors . . . [or]

•

Attempts to restage violence.”154

Facebook also announced the following additional measures:
•

An update to the text of its labels for posts containing
misinformation to read: “Joe Biden has been elected
President with results that were certified by all 50 states.”

•

A continuation of its ban on militarized social movements
and QAnon related content — citing its removal of 600
“militarized social movements” from the platform.

•

A continuation of pre-existing emergency measures and the
implementation of additional ones, including using AI to
demote content that likely violates its policies.155

In summary, Facebook has undertaken aggressive counterspeech
interventions in the form of labeling and commissioning authoritative
responses to speech to combat publicly available misinformation on
its platform, but, prior to the unprecedented events of the January 6
insurrection, Facebook had excluded politicians’ speech from such
interventions. In response to the events surrounding the January 6
insurrection, Facebook, following Twitter’s lead, undertook
unprecedented measures to ban President Trump from its platform in
response to Trump’s role in inciting the insurrection, as well as to
restrict certain types of similar harmful content.
C.

Effectiveness of Counterspeech Efforts

The platforms’ efforts to engage in forms of counterspeech to
combat misinformation appear to have been moderately effective.
According to one recent study, social media users were about fifty
percent less likely to share false stories if the stories had been labeled
as false. When no labels were used at all, participants considered
sharing about thirty percent of false stories in the sample, but that
figure dropped to about sixteen percent of false stories that had a label
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attached.156 In addition, the labeling of posts as false led to improved
accuracy in social media users’ beliefs. Researchers found, in an
exhaustive series of surveys across more than 10,000 participants on
a wide range of topics, that sixty percent of respondents gave accurate
answers when presented with counterspeech in the form of a factcheck/correction, while only thirty-two percent expressed accurate
beliefs when they were not presented with such a factcheck/correction.157 In addition, Hunt Allcott and his co-authors
report in their article Trends in the Diffusion of Misinformation on
Social Media, based on their study of “trends in the diffusion of content
from 570 fake news websites and 10,240 fake news stories on
Facebook and Twitter between January 2015 and July 2018,” while
“[u]ser interactions with false content rose steadily on . . .
Facebook . . . through the end of 2016,” since then, “interactions with
false content have fallen sharply.”158 The authors of the study find that
user interaction with known false news sites has declined by fifty
percent since the 2016 election.159 Based on these findings, the
authors conclude that “efforts by Facebook following the 2016
election to limit the diffusion of misinformation [namely, the ‘suite of
policy and algorithmic changes made by Facebook following the
[2016] election’160] may have had a meaningful impact.”161
156 Peter Dizikes, The Catch to Putting Warning Labels on Fake News, MIT NEWS
(Mar.
2,
2020),
http://news.mit.edu/2020/warning-labels-fake-newstrustworthy-0303 [https://perma.cc/2T78-257E].
157 Lee Drutman, Fact-Checking Misinformation Can Work. But It Might Not Be Enough.,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 3, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/whytwitters-fact-check-of-trump-might-not-be-enough-to-combat-misinformation/
[https://perma.cc/
R6KA-BZGM]. The political scientists conducting the surveys, Ethan Porter and
Thomas J. Wood, found that the most effective fact-checks shared four characteristics:
they were from a highly credible source, they offered a new frame for the issue rather
than merely calling the misinformation “wrong,” they didn’t directly challenge a
worldview or identity, and they happened before a false narrative could gain traction.
Id.
158 Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow & Chuan Yu, Trends in the Diffusion of
Misinformation on Social Media 1 (Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 18-029, 2018), https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews-trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/42VB-TXJX].
159 Id. at 5.
160 Id. at 3, 6.
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IV.

REGULATION OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND OF MICROTARGETING OF
POLITICAL ADS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
A.

Introduction

One of the gravest problems brought about by social media for the
marketplace of ideas is the facilitation of filter bubbles, in which
members of the public are able to insulate themselves from diverse
and antagonistic viewpoints and from effective counterspeech. The
fractionation and self-isolation of members of the citizenry pose grave
problems for our information ecosystem and for our democracy,
especially given the ability to microtarget advertisements — and
especially political advertisements — via social media platforms, as I
describe below.
Microtargeting of advertisements on social media platforms is the
practice that generally allows advertisers to limit their messaging to
narrow slices or subsets of individuals by exploiting the vast trove of
social data about individuals’ online behavior and preferences that
has been collected by social media platforms.162 Microtargeting of
advertisements in general stands in sharp contrast to the
broadcasting of ads in legacy media like major metropolitan
newspapers, radio and television, through which advertisers provide
content to a broad audience (e.g., to all readers of The Washington
Post). In contrast, microtargeting on social media delivers ad content
to very specific subgroups (e.g., readers who shop at Whole Foods
who are between the ages of twenty-five and forty-nine, and who have
watched a certain video on YouTube) or even to specific, listed
individuals (by using tools such as Facebook’s Custom Audiences).163
The practice of microtargeting employs and capitalizes on the social
data — such as an individual’s likes, dislikes, interests, preferences,
behaviors and viewing and purchasing habits — collected by social
media platforms about their users and made available to advertisers
to enable advertisers to segment individuals into small groups so as
162 Microtargeting,
INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/your-datamatters/be-data-aware/social-media-privacy-settings/microtargeting/ (last visited
Oct. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/H7N9-NZ7E].
163 See Dipayan Ghosh, What Is Microtargeting and What Is It Doing in Our Politics?,
MOZILLA: INTERNET CITIZEN (Oct. 4, 2018), https://blog.mozilla.org/internetcitizen/
2018/10/04/microtargeting-dipayan-ghosh/ [https://perma.cc/82AN-DBVU].

to more accurately and narrowly target advertising to them.164
Facebook, for example, reportedly tracks a list of over 1,100 attributes
on each of its users spanning users’ demographic, behavioral, and
interest categories.165
The practice of microtargeting enables advertisers to capitalize on
the comprehensive social data about individuals collected by social
media platforms. This social data is then used to design and
disseminate content that advertisers predict will be the most effective
and relevant with respect to the targeted segment of individuals. For
example, an advertiser might limit the scope of an ad’s distribution to
“single men between 25 and 35 who live in apartments and ‘like’ the
Washington Nationals.”166 While businesses derive certain benefits
from the microtargeting of ads in nonpolitical contexts,
microtargeting of ads in the political context can pose serious
problems for the democratic process and for the marketplace of ideas
model that underlies our First Amendment model of freedom of
speech.167 Unlike political advertising on mass media like broadcast
television or radio — in which large national or regional audiences
are exposed to the same political advertisement — by employing
narrowly cast microtargeted ads on social media, a political advertiser
can craft a specific ad to a much narrower intended audience, and to
only that specific audience, thereby preventing others from accessing
and scrutinizing the content of the ad.
Id.
Till Speicher, Muhammad Ali, Giridhari Venkatadri, Filipe Nunes Ribeiro,
George Arvanitakis, Fabrício Benevenuto, Krishna P. Gummadi, Patrick Loiseau &
Alan Mislove, Potential for Discrimination in Online Targeted Advertising, 81 PROC.
MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 7 (2018) (“For each user in the US, Facebook tracks a list of
over 1,100 binary attributes spanning demographic, behavioral and interest
categories that we refer to as curated attributes. Additionally, Facebook tracks users’
interests in entities such as websites, apps, and services as well as topics ranging from
food preferences (e.g., pizza) to niche interests (e.g., space exploration).” (emphasis
in original)).
166 Ellen L. Weintraub, Opinion, Don’t Abolish Political Ads on Social Media. Stop
Microtargeting., WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019, 6:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/2019/11/01/dont-abolish-political-ads-social-media-stopmicrotargeting/ [https://perma.cc/C9L9-QZ4V].
167 See generally Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, supra note 5
(explaining the constitutional relevance of the marketplace of ideas model and
illustrating the ways in which regulation of online speech and microtargeting impact
it).
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As described by Facebook’s former Chief Security Officer Alex
Stamos, the chief benefit of political microtargeting is that it allows
political advertisers to deploy “messages that are extremely finely
targeted to a very small number of people.”168 By microtargeting
political ads, a campaign can make different, and even contradictory,
appeals to voters in Michigan and to voters in New York or Atlanta. As
such, extensively deployed microtargeting of political ads — which is
by definition immune from the check of broad public scrutiny —
increases the possibility that a politician might lie with impunity. As
Stamos explains, “[i]f you allow people to show an ad to just 100 folks,
and then you run tens of thousands of ads, then it makes it extremely
difficult for your political opponent and the print media to call you
out.”169
Microtargeting of political ads also exacerbates problems of
balkanization, in which the messages that individuals receive are so
disparate as to dissolve the larger communities of interest that
otherwise ostensibly bind the country as a nation.170 A recent study in
fact showed that the very mechanism of Facebook’s ad delivery
increases partisanship.171 The authors of the study isolated the role
that Facebook’s perception of an ad’s content plays in determining the
audience that receives it by creating a generic, non-partisan ad with a
168 Peter Kafka, Facebook’s Political Ad Problem, Explained by an Expert, VOX (Dec.
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169 Id.
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[https://perma.cc/
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Research Shows. And Campaigns May Not Even Know It., WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019,
8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/10/facebooksad-delivery-system-drives-partisanship-even-if-campaigns-dont-want-it-newresearch-shows/ [https://perma.cc/6HHE-RXDU] (explaining that serving “users
with information that aligns with their existing worldview . . . ‘fragments political
discourse’”).
171 See MUHAMMAD ALI, PIOTR SAPIEZYNSKI, ALEKSANDRA KOROLOVA, ALAN MISLOVE &
AARON RIEKE, AD DELIVERY ALGORITHMS: THE HIDDEN ARBITERS OF POLITICAL MESSAGING 13
(2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1912.04255.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX3B-UFZE].

call to register to vote that linked to a generic domain.172 The authors
then “configured [their] web server to deliver a different response for
requests for these pages based on the IP address of the requestor.”173
If the requestor were identified as Facebook, it would be served “a
copy of the HTML from the official Trump campaign website, the
official Sanders campaign website, or a generic voting information
website.”174 All other requestors were simply “redirected to the
generic voting information website.”175 The ads therefore appeared
identical to users, but misled Facebook’s algorithm to associate them
with different political content.176 The authors found that even after
selecting a target audience, Facebook will prefer delivering the ad to
those it predicts will identify with its message.177 The authors
conclude that, “[c]ounterintuitively, advertisers who target broad
audiences may end up ceding [to] platforms even more influence over
which users ultimately see which ads.”178 Beyond the “ad creation and
targeting phase, where the advertiser selects their desired audience,”
the actual delivery of the ad further discriminates among possible
recipients.179 The selection is “rooted in the desire to show relevant
ads to users” and, the study notes, “can lead to dramatic skew in
delivery along gender and racial lines, even when the advertiser aims
to reach gender and race-balanced audiences.”180
The Internet Research Agency — the notorious agent of Russian
disinformation during the 2016 election cycle — was able to spend
pennies on the dollar (or ruble) compared to U.S. presidential
campaigns by deploying powerful microtargeted political ads on
social media. With its use of microtargeted political ads, the Agency
was able to powerfully leverage its influence to interfere with U.S.
elections. While the Trump and Clinton campaigns spent a combined
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$81 million on pre-election Facebook ads,181 for example, the IRA was
able to sow tremendous discord by spending only $46,000.182 This
miniscule amount of spending took advantage of the powerful ability
to target custom audiences by inferring interests from social media
users’ social data. The Internet Research Agency used the
microtargeting tools developed by leading technology companies —
including Facebook’s advertising customization tools — to target
specific audiences that they believed would be particularly
susceptible to false and misleading election-related information. In
particular, Russian operatives used Facebook’s Custom Audiences183
tool to display specific ads and messages to voters who had visited the
operatives’ fake social media sites — and used this microtargeting
technique to sew division among voters — specifically to suppress
Black voter turnout.184 Facebook’s Custom Audiences tool allows
advertisers, including, in this case, the Russian operatives, to input
into Facebook’s system a specific list of users they wish to target.
While such technological tools have long been used by corporate
America to deliver advertising to target audiences, Facebook and
other social media platforms were taken by surprise by the use of such
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[https://perma.cc/K43L-7B8X].
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(2017),
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/
open-hearing-social-media-influence-2016-us-elections#
[https://perma.cc/25UZGDFE] (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel, Facebook). For Facebook VP of
Advertising Rob Goldman’s ham-fisted reaction to Russia’s ad spending, see Kevin
Roose, On Russia, Facebook Sends a Message It Wishes It Hadn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/technology/russia-facebooktrump.html [https://perma.cc/6LNY-QJLK]; Nicholas Thompson, A Facebook
Executive Apologizes to His Company — and to Robert Mueller, WIRED (Feb. 19, 2018,
11:47
PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-executive-rob-goldmanapologizes-to-company-and-robert-mueller/ [https://perma.cc/PN5F-5Z5Q].
183 About Website Custom Audiences, FACEBOOK FOR BUS., https://www.facebook.
com/business/help/610516375684216 (last updated Sept. 27, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/
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184 Spencer Overton, State Power to Regulate Social Media Companies to Prevent
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tools for purposes of interference in the U.S. elections. As The
Washington Post explains: Russian operatives’ microtargeted political
ads
focused on such hot-button issues as illegal immigration,
African American political activism and the rising prominence
of Muslims in the United States. The Russian operatives then
used a Facebook “retargeting” tool, called Custom Audiences,
to send specific ads and messages to voters who had visited
those sites. . . . One such ad featured photographs of an armed
Black woman “dry firing” a rifle — pulling the trigger of the
weapon without a bullet in the chamber. . . . Investigators
believe the advertisement may have been designed to
encourage African American militancy and, at the same time,
to stoke fears within white communities . . . .185
Russian operatives used other Facebook tools in addition to Custom
Audiences to target groups by demographics, geography, gender, and
interests. As Clinton Watts, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, explains, “This means that any American who knowingly or
unknowingly clicked on a Russian news site may have been targeted
through Facebook’s advertising systems to become an agent of
influence — a potentially sympathetic American who could spread
Russian propaganda with other Americans.”186 Accordingly, “[e]very
successful click [provides the Russian operatives with] more data that
they can use to retarget. . . . [thereby speeding up] the influence
dramatically.”187 Targeted Facebook users were then shown ads
featuring divisive topics that the Russians wanted to promote in their
Facebook news feeds, which displayed the ads alongside messages
from friends and family members.

185 Elizabeth Dwoskin, Craig Timberg & Adam Entous, Russians Took a Page from
Corporate America by Using Facebook Tool to ID and Influence Voters, WASH. POST (Oct.
2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russians-took-apage-from-corporate-america-by-using-facebook-tool-to-id-and-influencevoters/2017/10/02/
681e40d8-a7c5-11e7-850e-2bdd1236be5d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6QKBARZF].
186 Id.
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The Russian Internet Research Agency notoriously used Facebook’s
complex ad targeted tools to microtarget political ads to African
Americans in order to suppress the Black vote in the 2016 election.188
African American audiences accounted for over thirty-eight percent
of U.S.-focused ads purchased by the Internet Research Agency, which
created social media accounts that falsely claimed they were African
American-operated and urged African Americans to “boycott the
election.” As Professor Spencer Overton explains:
Facebook’s “Ad Manager” allows an advertiser to select, from
a series of dropdowns, 52,000 targeting attributes, including
demographics/ethnic affinity (e.g., African American), issue
interests (e.g., “Malcolm X” or the “Civil Rights Movement”),
and Facebook engagement (e.g., liked a particular post). . . .
Facebook develops these profiles by collecting vast amounts
of data on its two billion users — including zip codes, posts,
comments, likes, clicks, and other information — and by
utilizing predictive modeling techniques to make
inferences.189
In short, using Facebook’s powerful microtargeting tools, Russian
operatives were able to target African-American members of our
electorate, sow division, and — among other problems — suppress
the Black vote.
The Internet Research Agency was not alone in its masterful
deployment of microtargeted political ads in the 2016 presidential
election. The Trump Campaign, for example, also targeted Black
Americans in specific neighborhoods in an effort to decrease voter
participation.190 The benefit, as then-Trump digital media director
Brad Parscale described it, was that “only the people we want to see
it, see it.”191 Parscale claimed that the use of microtargeted political
ads on Facebook and Twitter enabled the Trump Campaign to be one
See Overton, supra note 184, at 1815.
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hundred to two hundred times more effective in targeting members
of the electorate than the Hillary for President Campaign.192 Whether
or not Parscale’s particular claim is true, research shows that political
microtargeting indeed had a significant effect “in persuading
undecided voters to support Mr. Trump, and in persuading Republic
supporters to turn out on polling day.”193 Specifically, researchers
found that “targeted Facebook campaigning increased the probability
that a previously non-aligned voter would vote for Donald Trump, by
at least five percent” if they were a regular Facebook user.194
The microtargeting of political ads, compared to the dissemination
of political ads via traditional media outlets, is problematic for a
number of reasons from the perspective of First Amendment values,
and this is not even considering the problems caused by the
weaponization of microtargeting by Russian operatives interfering in
our elections, sowing division, and suppressing the Black vote. First,
political ads disseminated via traditional media are subject to broad
exposure and broad public scrutiny — which are necessary for the
truth-facilitating features of the marketplace of ideas mechanisms to
function. Microtargeted ads, on the other hand — which are
essentially the “online equivalent of whispering millions of different
messages into zillions of different ears for maximum effect and with
minimum scrutiny”195 — are not similarly subject to broad exposure
or broad public scrutiny. Second, and relatedly, microtargeted ads on
social media are more likely to be susceptible to the spread of
misinformation. As politics and technology expert Dipayan Ghosh
explains:
[Microtargeting of political ads facilitates] ‘organic’ shares and
reshares of content pushed by unpaid users who appreciate
192 Brad Parscale (@parscale), TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2018, 1:46 PM), https://twitter.
com/parscale/status/967516077956755457 [https://perma.cc/3JH4-DQFD].
193 Univ. of Warwick, Targeted Facebook Ads Shown to Be Highly Effective in the
2016 US Presidential Election, PHYS.ORG (Oct. 25, 2018), https://phys.org/news/201810-facebook-ads-shown-highly-effective.html [https://perma.cc/54S3-XQPE].
194 Federica Liberini, Michela Redoano, Antonio Russo, Angel Cuevas & Ruben
Cuevas, Politics in the Facebook Era: Evidence from the 2016 US Presidential Elections
5 (Ctr. for Competitive Advantage in the Glob. Econ., Working Paper No. 389, 2018).
195 Kara Swisher, Google Changed Its Political Ad Policy. Will Facebook Be Next?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/opinion/googlepolitical-ads.html [https://perma.cc/P832-RLD5].

what they see . . . and wish to spread it around their networks.
This results in free content consumption for the political
campaign. . . . [and this] viral spread of ‘unpaid’ or ‘organic’
content . . . further encourages the success of misinformation
campaigns.196
In short, the microtargeting of political ads disseminated via social
media, and especially via Facebook, is especially pernicious because it
is not subject to meaningful widespread public scrutiny — and
because false claims in such political ads are likely to be spread
farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than true claims in political
ads.197
B.

Facebook

Facebook has been the primary social media platform facilitating
the microtargeting of political ads to members of the public, allowing
political advertisers to have access to the vast trove of social data that
it collects on its users, to serve up ads to users with great precision
and with no public scrutiny. The company has also been unwilling to
prohibit the microtargeting of political ads on its platform, despite
many calls for it to do so, including by the chair of the Federal
Elections Commission.198 The company’s continued allowance of
microtargeting of political ads on its platform has posed grave
problems for the marketplace of ideas and the counterspeech
Ghosh, supra note 163.
According to a recent study published in Science, false news — and in
particular, false political news — spreads more quickly than the truth, with the top
one percent of false news cascades diffused to between 1,000 and 100,000 people
(whereas the truth rarely diffused to more than 1,000 people) and with false news
diffusing faster than the truth. The authors of the study investigated the differential
diffusion of all of the verified true and false news stories distributed on Twitter from
2006 to 2017; this included approximately 126,000 stories tweeted by approximately
three million people more than 4.5 million times. They observed that “[f]alsehood
diffused significantly farther, faster, deeper, and more broadly than the truth in all
categories of information, and the effects were more pronounced for false political
news” than for false news concerning other subjects, such as “natural disasters,
science, urban legends, or financial information.” Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan
Aral, The Spread of True and False News Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146, 1146, 1148 (2018).
198 See Rob Leathern, Expanded Transparency and More Controls for Political Ads,
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196
197

mechanism. Although Facebook in late 2019 was reportedly
considering increasing the minimum number of people who can be
targeted in political ads on its platform from 100 to a few thousand,
as of this date, Facebook has not made any changes to its policy
allowing for the microtargeting of political ads.199
What Facebook has done is to increase transparency and disclosure
requirements for political advertisements, so that such ad practices
can (theoretically) be analyzed and scrutinized.200 Facebook also
recently implemented a Political Advertising Policy that mandates
labeling, disclosure, and transparency requirements on political ads.
Under this Policy, every election-related and issue advertisement
made available on Facebook to users in the United States must be
clearly labeled as a “Political Ad” and include a “Paid for by”
disclosure, with the name of the individual or organization who paid
for the advertisement at the top of the advertisement.201 Second,
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estimated audience size — which enables researchers to identify and study microtargeted ads. MURPHY ET AL., supra note 129, at 35-37.
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under the Policy, Facebook collects and maintains a publicly available
archive of all political advertisements made available on its platform
as part of its Ad Library. The Facebook Ad Library provides
information regarding the budget associated with each ad and how
many people saw it, including their age, location, and gender,202 as can
be seen in the example below, in which a group called “Inner
Americans” spend under $100 to largely target men over age fortyfive with an ad entitled “Nancy Pelosi Goes On Unhinged Rant, Accuses
Trump of Being on Drugs During SOTU [State of the Union Address].”
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(May 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/05/ads-with-politicalcontent/ [https://perma.cc/EG78-WND2]; see also MURPHY ET AL., supra note 129, at
36 (“Since 2018, Facebook has maintained a library of ads about social issues,
elections or politics that ran on the platform. These ads are either classified as being
about social issues, elections or politics or the advertisers self-declare that the ads
require a ‘Paid for by’ disclaimer.”).

ntry=US&id=210610646733923&view_all_page_id=1073710140576
80 (click “See Ad Details”) (last accessed Oct. 17, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/7TSF-6QV8].]
Given the extensive use of Facebook’s platform for political speech
by politicians and for the dissemination of political ads, and given the
ability to engage in the practice of microtargeting of political ads via
the platform, the company’s decision not to subject such speech to
external fact-checking and its decision to exempt such speech from
generally-applicable counterspeech measures are ill-founded.
Facebook maintains, as mentioned above, that public scrutiny of the
political speech on its platform is an adequate substitute for the factchecking and counterspeech processes that all other public posts on
Facebook are now subject to. Given the ability to microtarget political
ads and given the filter bubbles in which many Facebook users exist,
Facebook’s approach regarding political ads is ill-founded. Facebook
did, however, impose a blackout period prohibiting new
advertisements about social issues, elections, and politics in the week
leading up to the 2020 presidential election203 — and continued this
blackout period indefinitely after the election in light of President
Trump’s refusal to concede. Apparently, Facebook did so because it
was concerned that the corrective of counterspeech would be
ineffective within this crucial and limited time period to impose
meaningful checks on false or misleading content in such
advertisements.204
C.

Twitter

Twitter has taken a different approach to the issues posed by
microtargeting of political ads. The company has taken the most
aggressive stance of the three major platforms by banning “political
ads” altogether. This prohibition applies only to the paid promotion of
political content. That is, a politician (or others) may still tweet
regarding the politician’s qualifications for office and reasons to
support him or her, but may not make such an appeal the subject of
paid advertising on Twitter; however, this ban does not affect
“organic” content or messages from politicians that are shared or
203 Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/
posts/10112270823363411 [https://perma.cc/CAG6-YXVJ].
204 Id.

retweeted. Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey explained that this restriction
was not intended to be a limitation on free expression, but rather one
restricting politicians from “paying for reach.”205 Twitter announced
its political advertising ban in November 2019, one year before the
2020 presidential election.206 The policy defines political content as
that which “references a candidate, political party, elected or
appointed government official, election, referendum, ballot measure,
legislation, regulation, directive, or judicial outcome.”207 Ads that
reference the above — including by “appeals for votes, solicitations of
financial support, and advocacy for or against any of the above-listed
types of political content” — are prohibited.208 Twitter exempts
“cause-based” ads — ads that “educate, raise awareness, and/or call
for people to take action in connection with civic engagement,
economic growth, environmental stewardship, or social equity
causes”209 by groups other than political organizations, candidates, or
politicians210 from its blanket ban on political ads,211 but provides that
cause-based ads may not be microtargeted. 212
205 Jack
Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Oct. 30, 2019, 4:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1189634377057067008 [https://perma.cc/863LBF54].
206 See Political Content, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/prohibited-content-policies/political-content.html (last visited Mar. 4,
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D. Google
Of the three major social media platforms, Google has undertaken
the most targeted approach to regulate microtargeting of political
advertisements. In November 2019, Google amended its rules to
restrict microtargeting so that political advertisers can only target ads
based on three characteristics: an individual’s age, gender, and
general location (defined by postal code).213 Political advertisers can
also use contextual targeting, which enables them to serve users with
ads according to the content that users are accessing.214 Under
Google’s rules, only the following characteristics may be used to target
election ads: geographic location (but not radius around a location),
age, gender, and contextual targeting options such as ad placements,
topics, keywords against sites, apps, pages, and videos.215 All other
types of targeting are not allowed for use in election ads, including the
use of Google’s powerful Audience Targeting products, Remarketing,
Customer Match, and Geographic Radius Targeting.216 Google’s
microtargeting policy applies to ads shown to users of Google’s search
engine and YouTube, as well as display advertisements sold by Google
that appear on other websites.217 Election ads will no longer be
allowed to target what are called “affinity audiences” that look like
213 Scott Spencer, An Update on Our Political Ads Policy, GOOGLE BLOG: KEYWORD
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://blog.google/technology/ads/update-our-political-adspolicy/ [https://perma.cc/9R8D-MQNR].
214 Id.
215 Political Content, GOOGLE ADVERT. POLICIES HELP, https://support.google.com/
adspolicy/answer/6014595 (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) [https://perma.cc/HVM6BZC5] [hereinafter Political Content (Google)]. Like Facebook, Google has also
implemented a host of procedural requirements for political advertisers. Advertisers
who wish to purchase and run election ads or use political affiliation in personalized
advertising in the United States must meet Google’s verification requirements. See id.
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other groups that campaigns might want to target.218 Further, political
campaigns can no longer upload their own lists of people to whom
they wish to show ads.219 In addition, Google will prohibit what is
known as “remarketing,” the process of serving ads to people who
have previously taken an action like visiting a campaign’s website.220
Google’s microtargeting policy prevents political advertisers from
taking advantage of some of Google’s most sophisticated targeting
tools, upon which it has built its dominant market position.221 The
most granular of those targeting tools are custom audiences (formerly
known as “custom affinity” audiences), an offering that has allowed
advertisers to create tailor-made audiences by targeting individual
interests and lifestyles as defined by keyword phrases.222 Google’s
sophisticated targeting tools also have allowed advertisers to target
or exclude according to demographic data such as age, gender,
household income, homeownership, and the like.223 General
advertisers may also target users who have previously interacted
with their site224 or submit previously collected customer data to reengage with the same group or expand to similar audiences.225 These
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sophisticated targeting tools are now unavailable to political
advertisers.226
Google’s limitations on the microtargeting of political ads constitute
an important and powerful measure in addressing the problems that
filter bubbles pose to our democratic process and to our marketplace
of ideas online. While Twitter arguably went too far in addressing the
problem of microtargeted political ads — by banning political ads
altogether — and while Facebook has not adopted any measures to
address the problems caused by the microtargeting of political ads
(problems that are mostly of Facebook’s own creation227), Google’s
approach appears to be a measured, effective, and appropriately
targeted one.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the counterspeech efforts undertaken by the major
social media platforms appear to have been moderately effective in
combatting falsehoods, limiting the dissemination of false or
misleading content, and bringing about the truth in the online
marketplace of ideas. The efforts undertaken by the major social
media platforms to engage in counterspeech to combat political and
election-related misinformation — by labeling harmful content and
developing and referring users to accurate information — and by
imposing some restrictions on the microtargeting of political ads is
largely consistent with First Amendment values and with the
marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment, according to
which the accepted response to bad speech is not censorship but more
(better) speech. In addition, the platforms’ efforts in countering such
misinformation contributes toward “producing an informed public
capable of conducting its own affairs” and facilitating the
preconditions necessary for citizens to engage in the task of

Political Content (Google), supra note 215.
As discussed above in the text accompanying notes 197–98, microtargeting
employs psychographic data — likes, dislikes, interests, preferences, behaviors, and
viewing and purchasing habits — collected by social media platforms about their
users. These platforms then make the data available to advertisers to enable more
narrowly targeted advertising. Thus, the problems caused by microtargeting are
fairly attributable to the social media platforms themselves.
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democratic self-government,228 which are also foundational goals of
our First Amendment jurisprudence.
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